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The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and 
Morality in Chapter 13 
BRADLEY M. ELBEIN* 
"I'm falling through a hole in the flag! 
Help! I'm falling . ... "1 
"For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain 
the whole world, and lose his own soul? "2 
Imagine an area of law defined by a comprehensive statute that courts 
feel free to defy. Posit a body of legislative history were bent and 
twisted in the furtherance of judicial interpretations which the plain 
meaning of the law does not support. Envision a situation in which, 
although the Supreme Court has signaled its preference that the plain 
meaning of the statute govern, the courts ignore this judicial guidance. 
* B.A. (High Honors; Special Honors in English) 1978, University of Texas, 
Austin; J.D., 1982, University of Texas School of Law. The author directed a corporate 
litigation section prosecuting civil professional liability claims during the "savings and 
loan crisis," managed a general corporate litigation section and now handles fidelity and 
surety claims for Fidelity & Deposit Companies of Maryland. The author wishes to 
express immense appreciation to his colleagues, Barbara Lukes and Larry Teiger, and 
to old friend and new lawyer Jeanette Burney, who read and critiqued the text. Special 
thanks must go to Ivo Wissenberg, who patiently compared his practice experience in 
Civil Law and common law countries. Acknowledgement is also due of Professor Jack 
Williams of the Georgia State University School of Law who both sparked the idea for 
this article and has served as the author's continuing inspiration. Of course, the author 
remains exclusively responsible for the ideas and errors contained in the text. 
1. GEROME RAGNI AND JAMES RADo, HAIR (1966). 
2. Mark 8:36 (King James). 
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Imagine judicial interpretations of this statute which express the 
presiding judges' personal moral values, not any legal principle grounded 
in the statutory text. Envision a judicial determination that some persons 
are not entitled to use the law, which on its face, was written for those 
persons' benefit. Suppose that the courts were to begin to condemn the 
very act of electing a statute and of complying with its provisions as an 
"abuse" of the spirit of the statute. 
These conditions would be seemingly inconceivable in the United 
States. Yet the reader who has engaged in this exercise has not invoked 
1984, the Spanish Inquisition, the Jim Crow laws, nor pre-apartheid 
South Africa. She has envisioned the current status of a particular facet 
of bankruptcy law in the United States. 
A debtor faced with a catastrophic financial situation ( e.g., a 
professional3 threatened with malpractice liability) may chose to seek 
protection in bankruptcy. A debtor finds several possible options in the 
Bankruptcy Code.4 The Code offers different discharges from indebted-
ness under chapters 7,5 11,6 and 137 of the Code. Nothing explicit in 
the Code prevents the debtor from choosing the chapter providing her 
with the most personally benefic~al relief. Nothing in the Code prevents 
this choice or warns of its potential consequences. Should the debtor 
choose Chapter 13, however, she might find herself sucked through a 
hole in the Code into a realm of uncertainty and unpredictability in 
3. The analysis in this paper applies to every Chapter 13 case; it is not limited 
to debtor professionals. The author, however, admits a particular interest in professionals 
in bankruptcy, because the genesis of the present inquiry was the questions unanswered 
in a previous article, Bradley M. Elbein, An Obscure Revolution: The Liabilities of 
Professionals in Bankruptcy, 48 S.C.L. Rev. 743 (1997). Here, as in the previous article, 
the term "professionals" refers to ''those who undertake any work calling for special 
skill, [who] are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also 
to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability." W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 1984) 
(including attorneys, accountants, physicians, and corporate officers or directors). 
4. 11 u.s.c. § 101-1330 (1994). 
5. A discharge under Chapter 7 discharges "all debts," subject to exceptions 
enumerated in § 727(a) (for a global denial of discharge to the debtor) and § 523 (for 
denial of discharge of a particular claim). See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1994). 
6. Under Chapter 11, the confirmation of a plan "discharges the debtor from any 
debt," except those set out in § 523 and § 727(a). 11 U.S.C. § 114l(d)(l)(A) (1994). 
7. Under Chapter 13, discharge of debts may be only partial. A debtor is required 
to submit a plan for payments of her debts, and discharge under § 1328(a) generally 
occurs only after the plan has been submitted. A complete discharge without satisfaction 
of the p1an may occur when the debtor suffers under some "hardship" defined in 
§ 1328(b). It should be noted that even under Chapter 13, however, some claims are 
excepted from discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994). 
440 
[VOL.34:439, 1997] Chapter 13 
SAN DIBGO LAW REVIEW 
which neither she nor her counsel can predict outcomes with any 
confidence. 8 
This article examines the chapter 13 discharge through its most 
important element: good faith. Part I explores why Chapter 13 is such 
an attractive option for debtors. Part II summarizes the eligibility 
requirements of Chapter 13. Part ill examines the cases interpreting 
good faith and determines that in most of them good faith is the crucial 
hurdle to a successful Chapter 13.9 Part IV demonstrates that, for the 
majority of courts, the "good faith" analysis transcends not only the 
Code but the whole arena of law. Part V concludes that the courts' 
interpretations of "good faith" have created a hole in the Code which 
threatens a complete destruction of codified bankruptcy law. 
8. It would be most fashionable to allude here to Alice in Wonderland as a 
metaphor for the descent from the smooth pattern of legal logic into unpredictable 
nonsense. In fact, a recent Westlaw search showed that more than 347 articles had 
alluded to Lewis Carroll's famous works (actually entitled Alice's Adventures in 
Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass). These articles were written about subjects 
as diverse as human rights (Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People's Rights or Victim's Rights: 
Reexamining the Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in International Law, 71 IND. 
L.J. 673 (1996)), corporate governance (Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and 
Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 
(1996)), and bankruptcy (Thomas J. Salemo, The Continuing Saga of the Statute of 
Limitations Dilemma Under the Pre- and Post-1994 Amendments to Section 546, 15 AM. 
BANKR. INS. J. 36 (1996)), to name only a few. 
The allusion to Alice in Wonderland is inapposite despite the insistence of certain 
critics of the legal profession that lay people are precisely like innocent children who 
find themselves following a strangely muttering animal down a dark hole into an absurd 
landscape. An allusion to Alice in Wonderland would miss key characteristics of a 
debtor's experience in Chapter 13. Alice, for instance, acted intentionally in both 
following the rabbit and in leaving her accustomed world behind. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S 
ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1867). The closer metaphor is Dorothy in The Wizard 
of Oz, who was sucked into Oz by a force she could not control and could not foresee. 
Moreover, Dorothy's situation, not Alice's, is most similar to that of the debtor who 
finds that she has fallen into the "good faith" vortex of chapter 13. "She was awakened 
by a shock, so sudden and severe that if Dorothy had not been lying on the soft bed she 
might have been hurt. As it was, the jar made her catch her breath and wonder what 
had happened .... " L. FRANK BAUM, THE WIZARD OF Oz 7 (1944). 
9. An electronic data search created a corpus of 738 cases, from 1979 through 
1996, interpreting "good faith" in Chapter 13. The author based the analysis in this 
Article on a review of approximately 200 of these cases, selected by a refinement of the 
search, as well as on the articles and authorities cited below. 
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I. A CHOICE, AN OPPORTUNITY AND A HOLE IN THE CODE 
As a debtor and her counsel examine the Code, it becomes evident to 
them that the differences in the discharge of debt offered in the three 
chapters can be significant. There are sound reasons of strategy to 
choose between the discharges available in chapters 7 and 13.10 A 
debtor who may file for protection under either chapter might choose, 
for strategic reasons, to file first under chapter 7: 
The filing of the chapter 7 case in the first instance may involve a question of 
strategy as well as debtor motivation. The needs of the debtor and the debtor's 
family may make such a course desirable. There may be doubt whether anyone 
would file objections to discharge or complaints to determine dischargeability. 
If no objections to discharge or no complaints to determine dischargeability are 
filed, the debtor might secure adequate relief without filing a chapter 13 case. 
The debtor may believe that the debtor can redeem the collateral and work out 
an acceptable program of payments voluntarily with the secured creditors. If 
this turns out successfully, the debtor could achieve the benefits of an 
installment payment program with the. secured creditors, without payment to 
unsecured creditors and without payment of the chapter 13 trustee's fees. If the 
calculations of the debtor and counsel go awry, the chapter 7 case can always 
be converted to chapter 13 case. The fall back position of chapter 13 is not lost 
by the ori~nal filing of a chapter 7 case, especially since the right to convert 
is absolute. 11 
A debtor, alternatively, may wish to file initially under chapter 13, or to 
convert from a chapter 7 to a chapter 13, for any of the following 
reasons: 
[T]he existence of one or more claims excepted from the operation of a chapter 
7 discharge; the desire of the debtor to redeem collateral, and the inability to 
do so in a lump sum payment; existence of nonexempt property which the 
debtor desires to retain; the unavailability of a chapter 7 discharge; or the need 
to protect a codebtor. In any of these or similar situations, a conversion motion 
can be filed converting the [chapter 7] case to one under chapter 13.12 
These are all legitimate strategic reasons and none are considerations 
prohibited by the explicit language of the Code. 
10. This paper does not address the discharge available under Chapter 11. Of the 
numerous debtors eligible under either Chapter 13 or Chapter 11, many choose Chapter 
13 over Chapter 11 because of the cost and complexity of discharge under Chapter 11. 
Moreover, Chapter 11 does not offer the breadth of discharge offered by Chapter 13. 
For debtors concerned with a discharge, the choice must be between Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13. 
11. 6 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE iflOl.08 at 101-27, 101-28 
(Lawrence P. King, et al. eds., 15th· ed. 1996) [hereinafter COLLIER BANKRUPTCY 
PRACTICE GUIDE]. 
12. Id. at 101-27. 
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The strategic choice between the two chapters may depend on one 
issue: dischargeability. Some claims are dischargeable under some 
chapters while non-dischargeable13 under others. Chapter 7 contains a 
large number of exceptions to discharge while Chapter 13 contains only 
a few. Thus, claims arising from wilful misconduct, fraud or defalcation 
(all nondischargeable under Chapter 7) may be discharged in Chapter 13. 
For this reason, Chapter 13 provides a safe haven for debtors who would 
otherwise be faced with liability that would survive the bankruptcy 
discharge. 
This haven, however, has a dark secret. To successfully obtain a 
discharge of indebtedness through Chapter· 13, the debtor must meet 
several statutory requirements. Among these statutory requirements is 
"good faith."14 Neither the Code nor the legislative history defines 
good faith. Furthermore, the cases in which bankruptcy courts have 
assessed good faith fail to fall into any pattern which would allow the 
practitioner or her client to determine whether a debtor will survive the 
good faith inquiry. "Good faith," in fact, takes the debtor from the safe 
world of commercial and bankruptcy law, in which predictability is 
valued above all things,15 and expels her into an unpredictable void, in 
which purity of heart, 16 not compliance with the Code, is what matters. 
13. This article uses the technically incorrect terms "dischargeable" and 
"nondischargeable" to refer to two types of claims under discussion throughout. On the 
one hand, there are claims which are not exceptional, that is, which do not rise above 
the undifferentiated mass of other debts from which the debtor seeks protection. These 
claims are discharged along with other debt under the general rule that all unexceptional 
liabilities are discharged. I call these claims "dischargeable," although technically it is 
the corpus of claims which are dischargeable, not any one claim. On the other hand, 
there are claims which are exceptional: they either rise above the mass of other claims 
to receive an exception to discharge under § 523 or § 727(b), or form the basis for an 
objection to discharge under § 727(c)(l). I refer to these exceptional claims as 
"nondischargeable" or as "surviving bankruptcy." Faced with the choice of using the 
technically correct terms "not excepted from discharge" and "subject to exception from 
discharge" or "forming the basis for an objection to discharge" along with a series of 
section numbers, or the less correct but more easily digested terms "dischargeable" and 
"nondischargeable," I opted for readability. 
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994). 
15. See discussion infra Part IV.C., p. 485. 
16. See discussion infra Part IV.A., p. 473. 
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II. CHAPTER 13 REQUIREMENTS 
Chapter 13 offers real opportunity for relief through the expanded 
discharge it makes available. In order to take advantage of this 
opportunity, however, the debtor must first meet eligibility requirements. 
In addition, after meeting the eligibility requirements, the debtor must 
propose a plan which qualifies under the statute. 
This article argues that the "good faith" requirement of Chapter 13 is 
the pivotal issue. To provide the context for the analysis of the courts' 
use of "good faith," it is helpful to sketch out the chapter's provisions. 
Part II of this article examines the breadth of Chapter 13 discharge, the 
requirements for a debtor to qualify under the chapter, and the statutory 
requirements for a Chapter 13 plan. 
A. The Chapter 13 Super-Discharge 
The Chapter 13 discharge is often referred to as a super-discharge 
because it allows the discharge of liability for acts which are not 
dischargeable under Chapter 7 .17 Under Chapter 7, claims for fraud or 
defalcation18 are not dischargeable; nor are claims arising from willful 
or malicious acts by the debtor. 19 Most claims for professional 
malpractice fall into one or more of these categories; therefore, a debtor 
professional cannot be certain of a discharge of malpractice liabilities 
under Chapter 7. 
Chapter 13 presents a marked contrast. Claiming Chapter 13 
protection allows the debtor to discharge some claims which cannot be 
discharged under Chapter 7. Although section 523 includes a long list 
ofclaims excepted from discharge (particularly subsections 523(a)(4) and 
523(a)(6)),20 which apply to discharges granted both under Chapter 721 
and under the Chapter 13 hardship discharge,22 with only a few 
17. See, e.g., In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989). 
18. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1996). 
19. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1996). 
20. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1994) excepts from discharge debts arising from "fraud 
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny," while 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994) excepts debts "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor 
to another entity or to the property of another entity." 
21. 11 u.s.c. § 727 (1994). 
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1994) provides a discharge without complete payment 
under the confirmed plan, provided that the circumstances which prevent completion are 
beyond the debtor's control. The subsection is fairly detailed and needs careful 
examination by a debtor who wishes to invoke it Should a debtor seek a hardship 
discharge, she will find that the liability that was nondischargeable in Chapter 7, but 
dischargeable under§ 1325(a), becomes nondischargeable again through§ 1328(c)(2). 
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exceptions, the claims nondischargeable under Chapter 7 are discharge-
able under the main discharge provision of Chapter 13, § 1328(a).23 
[This section] provides that as soon as practicable after the completion by the 
debtor of all payments under the plan, the court shall grant the debtor a 
discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502, 
except the following: certain long-term debts described in section 1322(b)(5); 
alimony and child support debts specified in section 523(a)(5); debts, as 
specified in section 523(a)(8), for educational loans, benefit overpayments and 
obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or 
stipend; debts, as excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(9), arising from 
any death or personal injury caused by a debtor's use of alcohol, drugs or other 
substances while operating a motor vehicle; and debts for restitution or a 
criminal fine included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime.24 
Thus, claims for subsection 523(a)(4) and 523(a)(6) liabilities, including 
professional malpractice liabilities, may not be discharged under Chapter 
7. These claims, however, may be dischargeable under Chapter 13 
because they are not included in the list of claims excepted by the 
exceptions to discharge. If the literal words of the statute are followed, 
Chapter 13 allows the discharge of most of the liabilities which would 
not be dischargeable under other chapters of the Code. 
B. Requirements for the Debtor 
To earn the expansive discharge of Chapter 13, the debtor must 
qualify under the statutory requirements of the chapter. The primary 
limiting factor is the restrictive monetary limitation of section 109(e).25 
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) provides that the court shall grant the debtor a discharge 
of all debts except those provided for under §§ 1322(b)(5) (payments curing a default), 
523(a)(5) (spousal and child support), 523(a)(8) (student loans), 523(a)(9) (death or 
personal injury resulting from drunk driving), 523(a)(13) (restitution), or 523(a)(7) (a 
criminal fine). 
24. COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, ,r 101.04[2], at 101-
14, 101-15. 
25. The debtor must owe, on the date of filing, less than $250,000 of non-
contingent, liquidated and unsecured debt, and less than $750,000 of non-contingent, 
liquidated and secured debt. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). This section should be 
considered along with§ 502(c), which provides a mechanism for estimating contingent, 
unliquidated claims. One way for a creditor to challenge a Chapter 13 claim is to 
eschew the "good faith" attack considered in the text, and instead, show that the debtor's 
debts exceed the debt ceiling. If successful, the creditor could force the debtor to 
convert to a Chapter 7 or to file a Chapter 11, neither of which provide the broad 
discharge which protect a debtor from ''nondischargeable" liability. 
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Although recent amendments raised the ceiling amounts,26 these 
monetary limitations may still prevent some debtors, particularly 
professionals, from using this chapter. The debts which are included in 
these limits are only noncontingent and liquidated.27 Cases debate at 
great length the precise meaning of these terms.28 If a debt is "liquidat-
ed,"29 it must be included in the calculation30 if it is also 
noncontingent. If a debt is "noncontingent"31 it may be included if it 
is also liquidated. Courts are unwilling to find a debt to be 
noncontingent when the liability has not been determined prior to filing 
for bankruptcy.32 Significantly for professionals seeking relief from 
malpractice liability, one commentator has stated that a pending tort 
claim is contingent and therefore does not count toward the debt that the 
professional has to squeeze in under the statutory ceiling. 33 Whether 
the debtor disputes the claim, as is likely with professional malpractice 
claims, is not relevant to the statutory ceiling calculation.34 There is 
significance, however, if debtor admits readily ascertainable claims. 35 
There are other eligibility requirements, not as important for purposes 
of this paper, including a limitation on prior bankruptcy filings,36 
citizenship37 and a regular income.38 None of these requirements, 
26. Pub. L. 103-394 § 108(a) raised the ceiling amounts from $100,000 and 
$350,000 to $250,000 and $750,000 respectively. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). 
27. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). 
28. See generally, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, 1 
101.03, at 101-8, 101-9. 
29. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wenberg (In re Wenberg), 94 B.R. 631 (9th Cir. 
BAP 1988), ajf'd 902 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1988). 
30. See In re McGovern, 122 B.R. 712 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1989). 
31. See generally COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, 1109.05. 
32. See, e.g., In re Ramus, 37 B.R. 723 (Banlcr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re Belt, 106 
B.R. 553 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1989). 
33. COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, 1109.05. 
34. See In re Jerome, 112 B.R. 563 (Banlcr. S.D. N.Y. 1990) (holding that, for the 
purpose of determining Chapter 13 eligibility, a dispute regarding liability or amount of 
a claim does not cause debt to be regarded as unliquidated). 
35. See In re Ramus, 37 B.R. 723 (Banlcr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding the amount 
was ascertainable when the debtor admitted the tort.) 
36. See COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, 1101.03(a), at 
101-9. 
Id. 
To deal with the problem of repetitive, abusive filings, the Code provides 
that no individual may be a debtor under any chapter of the Banlcruptcy Code 
who has been a debtor in a case pending under the Banlcruptcy Code at any 
time within the preceding 180 days if: (1) the case was dismissed by the court 
for failure of the debtor to bide by orders of the court, or to appear before the 
court in proper prosecution of the case; or (2) the debtor requested and 
obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case following the filing of a request 
for relief from the automatic stay provided by section 362 of the Code. 
37. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). 
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however, are as significant and as likely to disqualify a debtor from 
Chapter 13 relief as is the debt ceiling. 
C. Requirements for the Chapter 13 Plan 
After meeting these eligibility requirements, the debtor must then 
propose a plan which meets a different set of statutory requirements. 
The requirements for the Chapter 13 plan are set out in the subsections 
of § 1325(a). Five of these requirements are almost trivial; two are 
administrative (that the debtor have paid any fees required to be paid,39 
and that the plan comply with provisions of the statute4°); one is 
common sense (that she be able to fulfill. her plan),41 one sets a 
benchmark for payments to creditors,42 and one has to do with accep-
tance of the plan by creditors.43 
The sixth subsection contains the key requirement of Chapter 13. 
Section 1325(a)(3) provides that "the court shall confirm a plan if ... 
the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means 
forbidden by law.',44. This subsection contains three requirements for 
the plan itself: that there first be a plan, that it be proposed in good 
38. Id. 
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) (1994). 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(l) (1994). 
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1994). My colleague Larry Teiger argues that the 
question of plan "feasibility" embodied in this section is indeed far from trivial. He 
suggests that the failure to meet the "feasibility" requirement stops a huge number of 
plans. 
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994). 
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1994) (relating to treatment of secured claims). See 
also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l) (1994) (regarding objections relating to unsecured claims). 
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994). 
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faith,45 and that it not be proposed by any means forbidden by law.46 
This subsection stakes out the real battleground for Chapter 13. 
All of the requirements other than those of§ 1325(a)(3) are objective-
ly ascertainable. Either a creditor objects to the plan or she does not; 
either fees have been paid or they have not; either the debtor can comply 
with the plan or she cannot. Good faith, however, is subjective: 
subjective both in th~ sense that it inquires into the debtor's subjective 
intention, and that it invites the judge to bring her own subjective 
determination to bear. Herein lies the fundamental problem with 
Chapter 13. 
Ill. Goon FAITH 
Of the various statutory and judicial requirements for a Chapter 13 
plan, the great weight of the determination rests on the question of 
whether the plan was proposed in good faith as required by§ 1325(a)(3). 
According to one writer, "[t]he controversy concerning the chapter 13 
'good faith' test has resulted in more litigation than any other issue to 
arise since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.',47 This section has 
been interpreted as a policing mechanism to ensure that claims under 
Chapter 13 serve to accomplish only the aims and objectives of 
bankruptcy philosophy and not any other purpose.48 The majority of 
courts aggressively use "good faith" to patrol the Code, but the results 
of this policing are far from law or order. 
In this section, I examine the corpus of cases interpreting the "good 
faith" requirement. I begin by exploring the courts' duty to investigate 
45. Only the plan, not the bankruptcy itself, must be filed in good faith. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(a)(3) (1994). See In re Siciliano, 167 B.R. 999 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994), In re 
Flick, 14 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). However, many courts now import into 
Chapter 13 a good faith filing requirement, which cannot be found in·the text. See In 
re Love, 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Standfield, 152 B.R. 52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1993); In re Ristic, 142 B.R. 856 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1992). Moreover, as noted in the 
text below, the majority of cases interpreting good faith conduct an examination of the 
way in which the debtor's debts arose, e.g., In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1988), 
or of the totality of circumstances confronting the debtor, e.g., Metro Employees Credit 
Union v. Okoreeh-Baah (In re Okoreeh-Baah), 836 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1988)). 
46. The meaning of the clause "not by any means forbidden" is not clear. A 
diligent review of the relevant cases revealed no case interpreting this clause. As the 
author has noted elsewhere, a vague or ill-defined term in the Code seems to invite 
creative development of the law. See Elbein, supra note 3. This phrase would, therefore, 
seem to be fertile ground for judicial improvisation. 
. 47. Conrad K. Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis And 
Proposal For Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 273 (1981) (citing 53 cases through 
1981 ). An additional approximately 700 "good faith" cases followed during the next 15 
years from 1981 until 1996. See supra note 9. 
48. In re Chase, 43 B.R. 739 (D. Md. 1984). 
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good faith and the debtor's duty to carry her burden of proof on the 
issue. I then attempt to define the phrase, "good faith." The section 
concludes with an analysis of the factors used by courts to determine 
whether the "good faith" requirement has been satisfied. 
A. The Court:S- Duty 
The bankruptcy court must exercise an independent duty to determine 
whether the plan is confirmable, and whether or not a creditor objects to 
the plan.49 The court's duty is "independent" of action by any other 
party.50 This judicial determination considers not only whether the 
statutory requirements have been fulfilled, but also whether the plan is 
proposed in good faith.51 The good faith finding must be a separate 
and specific finding.52 A specific finding by the court is required 
irrespective of whether an objection to the plan is lodged.53 
B. The Burden of Proof 
The court may have an independent duty to review the plan, but the 
burden of proof falls on the debtor who proposes it.54 This can be a 
heavy burden, 55 its weight perhaps depending on the extent of the 
creditor's claims.56 For some courts, the debtor has no burden beyond 
showing that the plan was proposed in good faith.57 Even if a party in 
49. In re Gurst, 76 B.R. 985 (Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
50. In re Harris, 62 B.R. 391 (Banlcr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Bowles, 48 B.R. 502 
(Banlcr. E.D. Va. 1985). 
51. In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (emphasizing that the court's 
inquiry should focus on whether the plan abuses Chapter 13's provisions, purpose or 
spirit). 
52. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87 (9th Cir. 
BAP 1988); Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865 (2nd Cir. 
1983). 
53. In re Hartdegen, 67 B.R. 230 (Banlcr. N.D. Ala. 1986). 
54. Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990); In re 
Elisade, 172 B.R. 996 (Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Standfield, 152 B.R. 528 (Banlcr. 
N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Lewis, 170 B.R. 861 (Banlcr. D. Md. 1994); In re Humphrey, 165 
B.R. 508 (Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Lessman, 159 B.R. 135 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 
1993); In re Sullivan, 40 B.R. 914 (Banlcr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Smith, 39 B.R. 57 
(Banlcr. S.D. Fla. 1984). 
55. In re Farmer, 186 B.R. 781 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995). 
56. In re Warren, 89 B.R. 87 (9th Cir. BAP 1988); In re Noonan, 162 B.R. 581 
(Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 1993). See also In re Farmer, 186 B.R. 781 (Banlcr. D.R.I. 1995). 
57. In re Hines, 723 F.2d 333 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
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interest files an objection, the debtor still has to prove her eligibility for 
Chapter 13 relief,58 although the objector must carry his own burden of 
proof on the objection. 59 
The debtor walks a narrow path. If the plan is confirmable, confirma-
tion is mandatory60 even if there are objections· (as long as objections 
are overcome).61 Yet, even if the debtor complies with the express 
provisions of the law, she may be denied confirmation of a plan if the 
spirit of the law has been violated. Thus, even if all tests for approval 
of a Chapter 13 plan are met, a plan confirmation may be denied ifthere 
is a perceived abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit of Chapter 
13,62 or if the bankruptcy petition is filed in order to perpetrate a 
fraud.63 The license for this elevation of spirit over statute rests on two 
words: "good faith." · · 
' C. Good Faith 
What is "good faith?" The Code· does not· define it.64 . Courts 
acknowledge that the concept is amorphous. 65 Most courts reach the 
conclusion that a debtor's good faith is to be judged by the totality of 
the circumstances,66 even-though this standard leaves "good faith" with 
58. Tillman v. Lombard, 156 B.R. 156 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
59. In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710 (Banlcr. D. Minn. 1993); In re Cruz, 75 B.R. 56 (D. 
P.R. 1987). 
60. Benevides v. Alexander (In re Alexander), 670 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1982). 
61. In re Fizer, 1 B.R. 400 (Banlcr. S.D. Ohio 1979). 
62. In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Kem, 40 B.R. -26 
(Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
63. In re Norman, 162 B.R. 581 (Banlcr. M.D. Fla. ·1993) (determining that debtor 
coordinated his late filings of federal tax returns and Chapter 13 petition in order to 
perpetrate a fraud on the U.S. Government). 
64. It would be unfair to allege that the Code defines nothing useful. Section 101 
is replete with useful definitions, such as "accountant," "attorney," and "United States." 
Because "good faith" is so critical to the success of a Chapter 13 plan, however, the 
drafters might have provided some guidance on this phrase. Any guidance, no matter 
how ineffectual, might have assisted the courts in interpreting.this section, and prevented 
the chaos that Part V discusses. · 
65. See, e.g., St. Luke Parish Fed. Credit Union v. Wourms, 14 B.R.· 169 (Banlcr. 
S.D. Ohio 1981). .. . · 
66. See, e.g., State of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 
849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988); Spokane Ry. Credit Union v. Gonzales (In re Gonzales), 
172 B.R. 320 (E.D. Wash. 1994); In re Solomon, 166 B.R. 832 (Banlcr. Md. 1994), aff'd 
173 B.R. 325 (D.Md. 1994), rev'd 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995); In re Oglesby, 158 
B.R. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1993), on remand 161 B.R. 917 (Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1993); In re 
Huerta, 137 B.R. 356 (Banlcr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Reyes, 106 B.R. 155 (Banlcr. N.D. 
Ill. 1989); Fidelity & Cas. Co. ofN.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1988); Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Metz (In re Metz), 67 B.R. 462 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1986), aff'd 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Sellers, 33 B.R. 854 (Banlcr. D. 
Colo. 1983); In re Wilheim, 29 B.R. 912 (Banlcr. D.N.J. 1983); In re Tauscher, 26 B.R. 
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no semantic content at all. 67 By not having a precise definition, the 
practitioner and the courts must search for guidance as to how to satisfy 
the requirement. 
The phrase "good faith" is not uncommon in other areas of commer-
cial law. A practitioner might reasonably expect some elucidation in 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, or in the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC). Some courts · helpfully suggest that the good faith 
referenced in Chapter 13 must be identical to the good faith required in 
Chapter 11 reorganizations.68 Ultimately, however, the good faith 
requirement in Chapter 11 functions merely as a shorthand authorization 
for the bankruptcy courts to police their own jurisdiction.69 In the 
words of one court, "[g]ood faith ... is merged into the power of the 
court to protect its jurisdictional integrity from schemes of improper 
petitioners seeking to circumvent jurisdictional restrictions and from 
petitioners with demonstrable frivolous purposes absent any economic 
reality. "70 That the term should resist elucidation throughout the Code 
is not surprising because the same corpus of judges interpret Chapter 11 
and Chapter 13.71 
99 (Banlcr. E.D. Wis. 1982). See also cases cited infra note 79. 
67. To put this in plain language without lapsing into semiotics: the "totality of the 
circumstances" is a completely unbounded set of factors, in essence an infinite set. By 
saying that "good faith" signifies the examination of the totality of the circumstances, 
we say that good faith refers to that infinite set. If the "meaning'' of a concept is an 
infinite set of possibilities, then the concept has no exclusive meaning. Yet a "meaning" 
by definition must be more or less exclusive (at least, exclusive enough to define what 
a "meaning" does not mean). When the signifier signifies a non-exclusive set of 
signifieds, then the larger the set of possible signifieds, the more "vague" the signifier 
is. When the set of signifieds is infinitely large ( e.g., when "good faith" means the 
"totality of the circumstances"), the signifier (good faith), refers to everything and 
therefore means nothing. To a semiotician, it would be clear that this is the reason that 
courts can fill the empty concept of "good faith" with any content they desire; to a 
lawyer, this does not assist in determining how to satisfy the good faith requirement. 
68. In re Schaitz, 913 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Wiggles, 7 B.R. 373 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1980). 
69. See Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith 
Requirement: Why Reluctance to Ask Whether a Case Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead 
to the Incorrect Result, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 77 (1992); see also Note, Good Faith and 
Chapter 13 Discharge: How Much Discretion is Too Much?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 657 
(1989). 
70. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 737 (Bankr. S.D,N.Y. 1984) 
(quoting In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 B.R. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)). 
71. This is not surprising in human terms: judges are as bedeviled by apparent 
inconsistency as are the rest of us. But is this not a foolish consistency given the 
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The UCC promises to be more helpful. The commercial code defines 
good faith twice: once in its definitions section72 and once in the Sales 
article. 73 The term appears in more than fifty other sections of the 
Commercial Code. Some commentators have managed to glean general 
rules about its meaning: 
The Code employs two standards of good faith. Section 1-201(19) states the 
generally applicable "subjective" ("white heart and empty head") standard 
which concentrates on the actual state of mind of the party rather than on the 
state of mind a reasonable man would have had under the same circumstances. 
Thus, the section defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned." In the case of merchants, however, or at least those 
merchants governed by Article 2 on Sales, an objective element is added to 
their good faith duties. Section 2-103(l}{b) provides that "[g]ood faith' in the 
case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." This definition imposes a 
duty on merchants to meet rood faith requirements that are measured both 
subjectively and objectively.7 
If the reader does not see how these abstract definitions apply to our 
Chapter 13 problem, she is not alone. One bankruptcy scholar, having 
reviewed tlie UCC in the forlorn hope of finding assistance, laments that 
"[g]ood faith is one of the least specific standards in the law today. 
Even outside of bankruptcy, contracts scholars have long debated what 
good faith means."75 Her summary of the debate proves that years of 
different contexts of the two chapters? In Chapter 11, if the reorganization is to succeed, 
the debtor and creditor must continue to have a commercial relationship. Such a 
relationship might be said to require honesty of intention in the future, of the kind 
required between the parties in a commercial contract. For this reason, a kind of 
transactional good faith is required in Chapter 11. But in a Chapter 13 action, once the 
plan is approved the transaction is over. The debtor and creditor need have no future 
relationship. Instead, the creditor, if he is to have any continuing relationship, has one 
with the court. The only point at which the debtor's good faith intentions for the future 
are relevant to the creditor is during the proposal of the plan. For that reason, one 
would think that in Chapter 13 the courts would focus on what might be called 
propositional good faith: i.e., the question of whether the plan has been proposed with 
the honest intent to execute it. As noted below, however, the majority of courts neither 
recognize a difference in contexts nor limit themselves to propositional ( or ''plan") good 
faith. 
72. U.C.C. § l-201(19) (1995) (stating that "'[g]ood faith' means honesty in fact 
in the conduct or transaction concerned."). 
73. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1995) (providing that "'[g]ood faith' in the case of a 
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards 
of fair dealing in the trade."). 
74. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, § 1-203:01 
(1995). . 
75. Janet A. Flaccus, Have Eight Circuits Shorted? Good Faith and Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Petitions, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 401, 436 (1993). 
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dispute have produced much paper and no resolution. 76 Ultimately, 
there is little help to be found in the Commercial Code. 
D. Factors in Evaluating the Debtor's Good Faith 
Because the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a definition of good 
faith, the practitioner and the courts have had to attempt to discern a 
pattern among the cases interpreting the phrase. Courts have been 
generous in setting out the factors which they use to measure the 
debtor's conduct against the good faith standard. Sometimes courts 
simplify the factors into one loose principle: the debtor need not satisfy 
all of the factors set out in the various opinions as long as the plan is 
proposed with a legitimate purpose by debtors who have a reasonable 
hope of reorganizing.77 More commonly, however, the cases set out a 
76. Professor Flaccus, tracing the outlines of the debate in footnote 264 of her 
excellent article, refers to: 
Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law and the Sales 
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) 
(arguing that the only way to define good faith is to see what conduct it 
excludes, i.e. "Bad faith," Id. at 199-207, and even "bad faith" is difficult to 
pin down. Id.). Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law 
Duty to Peiform In Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980) (argues that 
good faith can be defined by using certain economic principles; the party 
exercising discretion performs in good faith when it exercises discretion for 
any purpose within the contemplation of the parties), Robert S. Summers, The 
General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) (disagrees with Professor Burton); Steven J. 
Burton, More on Good Faith Peiformance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor 
Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984) (argues that Summers has not 
convincingly criticized Burton's contribution); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic 
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981) (argues that 
good faith is a doctrine that deters opportunism and this helps to give it 
definition). 
Id. at 436, n.264. See also E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Peiformance and 
Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code,30 U. Cm. L. REV. 
666 (1963); accord Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good Faith? 
The Good Faith Peiformance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 
1335 (1988). 
77. In re Hope, 184 B.R. 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995). 
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laundry list of factors.78 The majority of courts agree on the following 
factors: 
1. amount of proposed plan; 
2. amount of debtor's surplus; 
3. debtor's ability to earn; 
4. probable duration of plan; 
5. accuracy of plan's statements; 
6. extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors; 
7. extent to which secured claims are modified; 
8. . type of debt to be discharged; 
9. whether any discharged debt is nondischargeable in Chapter 7; 
10. existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical 
expenses; 
11. frequency with which debtor has sought bankruptcy relief; 
12. motivation and sincerity of debtor; 
13. burden which plan's administration would place upon trust-
ee.19 . 
Other courts vary the list slightly, adding or substituting factors·such as: 
14. debtor's honesty in representing facts;80 
15. amount of attorneys fees;81 
16. living expenses of debtor and dependents;82 
17. legal and equitable effect of proposed plan.83 
Neither list is prescriptive: a debtor may find a court uninterested in 
· many of these factors. · Yet neither list is exclusive either, because there 
may be other dispositive factors.84 The reality is that the courts will 
announce the factors they intend to consider and then make conclusory 
determinations whether or not a plan has been proposed in good faith 
without explicitly weighing the results of their inquiries. · 
78. Robinson v. Tenantry (In re Robinson), 987 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1993); Soc'y 
Nat'l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1992) (listing also the 
factors of amount ofattomey's fees and debtor's living expenses); State of Ohio, Student 
Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988) (adding 
debtor's sincerity, motivations, degree of effort and ability to earn). 
79. In re Doersam, 849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988); Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d 
1344 (10th Cir. 1983); Kitchens v. Georgia Ry. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 
F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 
1982); Fidelity & Cas. Co. ofN.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1988). See also In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (Bankr. C. D. Utah 1980). 
SO. In re Oliver, 186 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995). 
81. In re Wilson, 168 B.R. 260, 262 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994). 
82. Id. 
83. In re Whipple, 138 B.R. 137 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991). 
84. In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 
885 (11th Cir. 1983). · 
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Some courts focus their "good faith" analysis ori other issues. The 
court mi~ht rely on the length or duration of a Chapter 13 plan in its 
decision. 5 Another court might l~ok at whether the debtor has 
allocated a "sufficient" portion of her income to payments under a 
plan. 86 In determining allocation, however, the court may only 
consider allocation urider limited circumstances. 87 A court might focus 
only on the sufficiency of payments to unsecured creditors. Some courts 
require some payment to unsecured creditors to satisfy the "good faith" 
requirement. 8 Other courts require no such payment, 89 or focus on 
the percentage of payment as the dispositive factor. 90 
At first glance these opinions seem to be scattered randomly about the 
landscape. But they are not a~ disparate as they appear. They naturally 
cluster into two distinct approaches to the good faith requirement. The 
cases utilizing one approach ponduct the good faith inquiry as an 
investigation strictly into the debtor's conduct in _proposing a plan. I 
85. Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d '1123, 1127 (6th Cir. 1990); In 
re Smith, 130 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991). See also In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 
59, 63, 64 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Green, 169 B.R. 480, 483 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
1994); In re Balcer, 129 B.R. 127 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991); In re Carpico, 117 B.R. 335, 
336, 337 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Jackson, 91 B.R. 473 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); 
In re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (illustrating that a court took 
offense to a debtor's extension of his plan long enough to pay·offhis sports car, but not 
long enough to pay off unsecured creditors). · 
86. In re Adamu, 82 B.R. 128 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (holding that allocation of 
income to plan was sufficient where all of disposable income went to payments of 
creditors); In re Curry, 77 B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (determining that allocation 
of income was not sufficient where debtor, a minister, made charitable contributions to 
church of 50% of his income); In re Hale, 65 B.R. 893 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1986) (finding 
that allocation wasn't sufficient because debtors did not malce any effort to reduce their 
standard ofliving in order to maximize the plan distributions). See also infra note 147. 
87. In re Stein, 91 B.R. 796, 802, 803 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988). 
88. Tenny v. Terry (In re Terry), 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Saglio, 153 
B.R. 4 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993); In re ~indsey, 122 B.R. 157 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In 
re Lattimore, 69 B.R. 622 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); bi re Smith, 39 B.R. 57 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Wojick, 10 B.R. 328 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Iacovoni, 2 
B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980); In re Hobday,.4 B.R. 417 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). 
89. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Metz (In re Metz), 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 
1987); In re Weiss, 34 B.R. 346 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that the fact that 
nominal payments are to be made to unsecured creditors is not a per se violation of good 
faith requirement); U.S. Life Credit v. Carter (In re Carter), 9 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1981); Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Walsey (In re Walsey), 7 B.R. 779 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1980); In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584 (Bankr. D.Colo. 1980). 
90. In re Anderson, 3 B.R. 160 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); Cleveland Trust Co. v. 
Keckler (In re Keckler), 3 B.R. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). . 
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shall refer to these cases as the plan good faith cases. The courts in the 
cases illustrating the other approach base their determination of good 
faith on the debtor's pre-plan and even pre-petition conduct. These 
courts concentrate on what might be referred to as broad good faith. I 
shall examine these distinct approaches in detail below and derive an 
organizing principle which is driven by the difference in philosophy 
between the two approaches. 
1. Plan Good Faith 
The explicit terms of§ 1325(a)(3) require only an evaluation of good 
faith in the proposal of the plan. We may not have a clear definition of 
what constitutes "good faith," but the statute plainly dictates that good 
faith be considered with respect to proposal of the plan. Despite the 
plain meaning of the statute, only a minority of courts apply 
§ 1325(a)(3) as written.91 To this minority, it is clear that the good 
faith requirement relates only to the proposing of the plan, and therefore, 
these courts may most succinctly be referred to as the plan good faith 
courts. 
This reliance on the statute itself has an interesting result. The plan 
good faith courts seldom rely on the legislative history of the statute. A 
few of them buttress their interpretations of the statute with arguments 
from the legislative history, but more commonly there is a decided lack 
of interest in that rather obscure and ambiguous source. This lack of 
interest is the direct result of relying on the unambiguous words of the 
statute, and it stands in startling contrast to the. attention paid to the 
legislative history by the broad good faith courts. 
A few early cases relied on their own close reading of the statute to 
determine that "good faith" was to be judged strictly in relation to 
proposing the plan, and not in relation to any broader factors (such as 
pre-petition conduct).92 That is to say, "[s]ection 1325(a)(3) provides 
that the debtor's plan must be proposed in good faith, not that the debt 
was incurred in good faith."93 Later cases reached the same conclusion, 
91. For the basis of this conclusion, see supra note 9, and.infra note 173. 
92. See, e.g., In re Carter, 9 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981), G.F.C. Consumer 
Discount Co. v. Scott (In re Scott), 7 B.R. 692 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (determining, 
after a close reading of§ 1325, that everything not excepted is discharged); Overland 
Park Dodge, Inc. v. Graff(In re Graft), 7 B.R. 426 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (determining, 
after a review of statutory provisions and amendments, that Congress' clear intent was 
to allow the discharge of otherwise nondischargeable liability). See also Ravenot v. 
Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982) (providing a list of factors to 
guide the good faith analysis-all involving the debtor's conduct in proposing the plan). 
93. In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 564 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (quoting In re Smith, 
848 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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but did so explicitly in revolt against a tide of judicial activism that 
interpreted "good faith" as "a license to read into the statute require-
ments Congress did not enact."94 While there is some evidence that the 
Supreme Court might adopt this strict interpretation of the statute, the 
Court has not directly addressed the issue.95 Today, few cases and few 
scholars pitch their tents in the plan good faith camp.96 
94. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,431 (7th Cir. 1982). See also In re Schaitz, 913 
F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Farley, 114 B.R. 711 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990). 
95. In three relatively recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has held 
strictly to the terms of the Bankruptcy Code, although none of these cases directly 
addresses "good faith." Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991) was a chapter 
13 case dealing with serial filing. Refusing to infer a limitation on serial filing from the 
silence of the Code, the Supreme Court held that "expressly enumerated exceptions [are] 
presumed to be exclusive." Id. at 87 (following the holding.of United States v. Smith, 
499 U.S. 160, 167 (1991)). -In Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) and Taylor v. 
Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992), the Court held that the courts have no authority 
to place limitations on various sections of the Code (11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) and 11 
U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994) respectively) where Congress did not do so. Applied to the 
"good faith" context in Chapter 13, these opinions suggest that the Supreme Court would 
look to the plain meaning of the statute and refuse to read into the Code requirements 
that Congress did not see fit to write in. 
96. Of the few articles on "good faith," two are noteworthy, and both address 
Chapter 11 's "good faith" requirement. Prof. Janet A. Flaccus, in Have Eight Circuits 
Shorted? Good Faith and Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petitions, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 401 
(1993), argues energetically that the history of bankruptcy and the legislative history of 
the Code belie the broader readings of good faith in Chapter 11. Eugene J. DiDonato, 
in Good Faith Reorganization Petitions: The Back Door Lets the Stranger In, 16 CONN. 
L. REV. 1 (1983), reaches an opposite conclusion, though much of his article supports 
the strict interpretation of the statute. DiDonato notes, for example, that upon a close 
reading of Chapter 11, the statute does not require a petition to be filed in good faith but 
instead requires that only the plan be filed in good faith. Id. Thus, DiDonato illustrates 
(without commenting on it) the strict parallelism in the Code: in both chapters allowing 
a plan of reorganization, the statute requires only propositional good faith. Id. 
DiDonato' s article is also interesting in its musings on alternate grounds for deriving 
a good faith filing requirement. He notes the following possible statutory bases: 11 
U.S.C. § 30S(a)(l) (1994) allows the court after notice and hearing, to dismiss a case "if 
the interests of the debtor and creditor would be better served," id. at 5, 6; 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105 (1994): "A bankruptcy court has the powers of a court of equity and under section 
1 OS may issue any order, process or judgment necessary to carry out the provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code. Because a bad faith petition constitutes an imposition on the 
court's jurisdiction, it is subject to dismissal based on equitable principles such as lex 
nemini operatur iniquum, neminifacit injuriam (the law never works an injury, nor does 
a wrong) or equitable doctrines such as the doctrine of clean hands," id. at 6, and 11 
U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994), permitting relief from stay for cause upon application ofa party 
in interest: "[A]lthough section 362(d) does not sanction dismissal of an entire case, by 
providing for the elimination of the stay if a petition is filed in bad faith, it has the effect 
of enforcing a good faith requirement." Id. at 7. These alternate grounds are critical for 
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The plan good faith cases further cluster into subgroups. Courts 
reading the statute restrictively tend to concern themselves with five 
issues: whether the plan is non-discriminatory; whether the plan 
encompasses the debtor's best efforts; whether the percentage of 
repayment is sufficient; whether the debtor has complied with the Code's 
procedural 'provisions; and whether the debtor's intentions in proposing 
the plan are honest. · 
A plan which unfairly discriminates between creditors is said to violate 
the good faith requirement.97 Few of the cases explain where an anti-
discrimination provision resides in·§ 1325(a) and this provision is not 
explicit in the Code. Courts have apparently imported the§ 1325(a)(3) 
non-discrimination requirement from§ 1322(b)(l).98 More commonly, 
cases hold that <liscnminatory treatment may merely bear on the good 
faith determination.99 According to some courts, discriminatory plans 
cannot be confirmed;100 other courts approve plans which are discrimi-
natory, as long as there is a reasoned discrimination. 101 For some 
courts, discrimination becomes significant only where a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy is converted to a Chapter 13 .102 In these cases, there is no 
particular pattern, except that th~se courts confine their inquiry to the 
terms of the proposed plan. · · · · 
A second factor· examined by plan good faith courts is whether the 
debtor has drafted a plan which encompasses her best efforts. 103 It is 
not clear in which direction the debtor's best efforts must lie.· On the 
one hand, the best effort toward complying with statutory requirements 
does not suffice for "good faith" to be met.104 The most reasonable 
conclusion is that the debtor is required to make her best efforts toward 
DiDonato, because he is apparently determined to assert a good faith filing requirement. 
These alternatives are also interesting for our purposes, because a good faith filing 
requirement in Chapter 13, based on one or more of the sections cited above, might be 
a great deal more attractive than the arguments used by the courts. In addition, relying 
on these alternate grounds might avoid the judicial flights of fancy set out and analyzed 
in the text below. · 
97. In re Whittaker, 113 B.R. 531 (Banlcr. D. Minn. 1990). 
98. Section 1322, "Contents of plan," provides in subsection (b)(l) that the plan 
may designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, but ''may not discriminate unfairly 
against any class so designated." 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994). 
99. In re Sellers, 33 B.R. 854 (Banlcr. D. Colo. 1983). 
100. In re Mielke 39 B.R. 556 (Banlcr. D. N.D. 1984); In re Moore, 24 B.R. 857 
(Banlcr. N.D. Ill. 1982); In re Walker, 20 B.R. 372 (Banlcr. E.D. Va. 1982); In re 
Cooper, 3 B.R. 246 (Banlcr. S.D. Cal. 1980). 
101. In re Whittaker, 113 B.R. 531 (Banlcr. D. Minn. 1990). 
102. In re Warner, 115 B.R. 233 (Banlcr. C.D. Cal. 1989). 
103. In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876 (Banlcr. W.D. Ky. 1980). 
104. Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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funding the plan.105 Courts occasionally provide a laundry list of 
factors when they make this "best efforts" inquiry.106 On other hand, 
best efforts, even admitted as such, may be insufficient for a plan to be 
considered filed in good faith. 107 In fact, the debtor may not even be 
required108 to use her best efforts. As with the non-discrimination 
requirement, the origin of the "best efforts" requirement is unclear. This 
requirement certainly is not expressed in the statute and may be a legacy 
from pre-Code practice. 
A third inquiry in plan good faith considerations is whether a plan 
serves the best interests of the creditors. Some courts claim that the 
"'best interest of creditors test' [is] embodied in Section 1325(a)(4)."109 
This section, however, certainly does not explicitly contain this test. 110 
This consideration may also remain from previous practice. The "best 
interests of the creditors" test was an old test, supplanted by new judicial 
guidelines for good faith objections. 111 Nevertheless, there are numer-
ous references in Chapter 13 plan confirmation cases to a. "best interests 
of creditors" test.112 As might be expected, a plan's adequacy to meet 
the "best interests of the creditors" does ·not guarantee con:firmation.113 
A fourth inquiry provides the clearest and broadest distinction between 
the plan good faith and the broad good faith approaches. This 
investigation inquires into the debtor's equitable conduct within the Code 
and its procedural provisions, including its provisions for disclosure to 
105. Fidelity & Cas. Co. ofN.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1988); In re Myers, 52 B.R. 248 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Weyand, 33 B.R. 
553 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Ware, 9 B.R. 24 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). 
106. In re Hildremyr, 8 B.R. 676 (Bankr. S.D. 1981). 
107. In re Kuriakuz, 155 B.R. 454 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993). 
108. In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1980). 
109. In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 262 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980). 
110. Section 1325(a)(4) provides that "the court shall confirm a plan if ... the 
value ... of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed 
unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid ... under chapter 7 . 
. . . " 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994). It might be argued that the best interest of the 
creditors ( even in a Chapter 13 which would have been a no-asset Chapter 7 liquidation) 
would always be to have a judgment rather than a zero or minimal payment and a 
discharge. Nevertheless, this section is generally referred to as the "best interests of the 
creditors" test. 
111. In re Ramus, 37 B.R. 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). 
112. In re Turner, 168 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1994); In re Doddy, 164 B.R. 
276 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994). 
113. Cherry Creek Homeowners Ass'n v. Lincoln (In re Lincoln), 30 B.R. 905 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). 
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creditors and the court and the Code's payment provisions. Where the 
misconduct is intentional, the court's decision is easy. Good faith cannot 
be found where the debtor abuses the bankruptcy process by using the 
Code for unfair advantage in business, 114 nor where the debtor acts to 
prevent orderly and fair adjustment of credit relationships. 115 Misrep-
resentations in the plan or the bankruptcy schedules will usually lead to 
a "bad faith finding."116 Here, of course, courts are on firm ground 
because these kinds of abuses are prohibited in Chapter 13 through the 
application of§ 105(a)117 and § 1307.118 
The plan good faith courts, however, do not limit their investigation 
of the equitable conduct of the debtor in bankruptcy to willful miscon-
duct. They also examine conduct that does not rise to the level of 
intentional misconduct, or at least cannot be proven to be such. Factors 
in determining whether a debtor has acted equitably within the bankrupt-
cy process include a failure to list creditors, 119 high expenses, 120 and 
a failure or refusal to produce records requested by creditors.121 One 
point must be clear, because it looms large in the later analysis: in each 
of these analyses, even in an examination of equitable conduct, the plan 
good fait~ courts restrict their inquiry to conduct related to the plan 
itself. 
Some of the plan good faith courts conduct a still more searching 
examination, even broader than the "equitable conduct" analysis. These 
courts examine the honesty of the debtor's intention in filing her plan. 
114. Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. 
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1028 (1986). 
115. In re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994). 
116. Heid v. Goeb (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Jacobs, 43 
B.R. 971 (Bankr. N.Y. 1984) (illustrating that when court learns of material misrepresen-
tations, it has duty to conduct a good faith hearing to safeguard the integrity of the 
bankruptcy process). 
117. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) grants the court broad power to "issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this 
title," as well as "sua sponte, [take] any action or [make] any determination necessary 
or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of 
process." 
118. 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (1994) sets out the conditions upon which a Chapter 13 
filing can be voluntarily or involuntarily converted to a Chapter 7 or dismissed. Among 
the grounds listed are unreasonable delay, nonpayment of fees, failure to file a plan or 
make payments, and so forth. 
119. In re Tipton, 118 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); In re Hartdegen, 67 B.R. 
230 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986). 
120. In re Strong, 26 B.R. 814 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (determining that high 
· monthly expenses were too far outside the spirit and purpose of the Code to be in good 
faith). 
121. In re Sullivan, 40 B.R. 914 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1984) (holding that the plan was 
not proposed in good faith when the debtor failed to cooperate with creditors who were 
investigating his financial conditions). 
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Honesty in this context f pears to means full and complete disclosure, 
and honesty of purpose.' This inquiry is the most radical of the plan 
good faith examinations, because it is not objectively discoverable and 
involves an element not stated in the statute and not. 
Both of the last two inquiries push the boundaries of what we have 
called plan good faith. Both inquiries look beyond the Chapter 13 plan 
to a consideration of the conduct during the pendency of the bankruptcy 
itself. What is most interesting about these inquiries is what they fail to 
determine. None of the plan good faith cases inquire into the debtor's 
conduct prior to the bankruptcy filing. That inquiry would seem to be 
far beyond the Bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. The plan good faith 
cases, even at their most expansive "equitable conduct" and "honesty of 
intention" analyses, stop short of making this inquiry. For this reason, 
although the "equitable conduct" and "honesty of intention" cases 
undertake the broadest of the plan good faith analyses, these cases 
generally do not find a lack of good faith. Thus, even with this broader 
approach, a ·court which undertakes a plan good faith inquiry most likely 
will find that a plan has been filed in good faith. 123 
2. Broad Good Faith 
Other courts are not so restrained. The courts which undertake the 
broad good faith inquiry-representing the vast majority of good faith 
cases-examine debtor's pre-plan and even pre-petition conduct. The 
broad good faith inquiry begins where the plan good faith inquiry ends. 
The plan good faith courts might look beyond the plan, but even the 
most zealous confine themselves to an examination of the debtor's 
conduct within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. The broad good faith 
courts begin their inquiry by focussing on the debtor's conduct before 
122. In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59 (Banlcr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Graves, 19 B.R. 402 
(Banlcr. W.D. La. 1982); In re Wiggles, 7 B.R. 373 (Banlcr. N.D. Ga. 1980). 
123. See statistics discussed infra note 173. There should be no mystery as to why 
this is so. The narrower the inquiry, the fewer factors the judge will consider. The 
fewer factors considered, the less chance that the court will find facts that might be 
considered "bad faith." The broader the inquiry, the greater chance that the creditor will 
present evidence or the court will discover facts that alleged bad faith. As banlcruptcy 
judge William Greendyke noted, "every debtor 'is a bad guy' and [creditors] are going 
to give you lots of evidence about how bad the debtor is and how bad the debtor has 
been historically." Roundtable Discussion, Good Faith: A Roundtable Discussion, l AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 11, 23 (1993). 
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she ever came before the court and end the inquiry (if there are indeed 
any limits on the breadth of this analysis) outside the Code and even 
beyond the law altogether. 
The cases that undertake a broad good faith in,quiry are many and 
varied. Because the courts which undertake this inquiry recognize no 
organizing principle (at least none that imposes limits narrower than the 
broad laundry lists given above), superficial patterns in these cases are 
somewhat difficult to discern. Nevertheless, patterns do exist. Three 
distinct issues emerge as primary inquiries in the broad good faith 
analysis and surface as primary motivators in these courts' :dulings. 
These inquiries include: the debtor's pre-plan conduct, the potential 
Chapter 7 dischargeability of debts, and potential abuse of the formal 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
a. Pre-Plan Conduct 
Many of the cases employing the broad good faith analysis examine 
the debtor's pre-plan conduct. While conduct could be pre-plan but 
post-petition in theory, scrutiny of this element in practice almost always 
involves inquiry into conduct before the petition was filed. Even courts 
sympathetic to the broad good faith analysis may question whether a 
court can consider pre-petition conduct. 124 Nevertheless, the broad 
good faith courts do ask: What kind of conduct gave rise to the claims 
the debtor seeks to discharge in Chapter 13? 
If the language of the cases is to be believed, courts which examine 
pre-filing conduct do so cautiously. Some courts note that pre-filing 
conduct is only one of several considerations in their good faith 
analysis. 125 Other courts warn that it should not be the only factor 
considered. 126 Thus the issue of pre-filing conduct is sometimes 
considered only one of the relevant issues. 
The Sixth Circuit's approach to good faith is typical of the courts' 
approach to examining pre-filing conduct. In its opinion in In re 
Doersam, 127 the Court manages to avoid holding that pre-petition 
conduct. is relevant to the good faith inquiry while basing its opinion on 
124. See In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). . 
125. 550 West Ina Rd. Trust v. Tucker (In re Tucker), 989 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 
1993); In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1Q95); In re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Carver, 110 B.R. 305 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re 
Davis, 68 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986). 
126. Metro Employees Credit Union v. Okoreeh-Baah (In re Okoreeh-Baah), 836 
F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1988). . 
127. State of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d 
237 (6th Cir. 1988). ' 
462 
[VOL. 34: 439, 1997] Chapter 13 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
the principle that it is. The op1mon quotes dicta from a previous 
decision with approval, clearly giving the courts license to inquire into 
pre-plan condu~t: 
Obviously, the liberal provisions of the new Chapter 13 are. subject to abuse, 
and courts must look closely at the debtor's conduct before confirming a plan 
. . . . The view that the Bankruptcy Court should not consider the debtor's pre-
plan conduct in incurring the debt appears to give too narrow an interpretation 
to the good faith requirement. 128 
The Doersam opinion does not attempt to square its broad inquiry with 
statutory language or Congressional intent ( although, given the wild 
claims about Congressional intent reviewed below, the court may have 
avoided this discussion for the sake of judicial economy). More 
interestingly, the opinion fails to explain against what standard it judges 
the plan-good faith inquiry as "too narrow." The Court declines to 
accept the prima facie meaning of the statute without explaining 
why.129 
The pre-plan conduct inquiry is, in essence, an investigation into how 
the debt originated. The manner in which the. d~bt was incurred 
certainly results in greater scrutiny.130 The rationale for this inquiry 
is that if the debt was incurred in bad faith, that factor might cause a 
court to take an additional look at the question whether the plan was 
proposed in good faith. For example, certain pre-plan conduct might 
cause the court to determine that no plan could be filed in good faith 
under any circumstances. 131 Some courts. have held that the bad faith 
origin of a liability justifies the court in forcing a debtor to modify her 
128. Id. at 239 (citing Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431-
32 (6th-Cir. 1982) (citing In re Kull, 12 B.R. 654, 659 (D.C.S.D. Ga. 1981)). 
129. There is another oddity which should be noted briefly and then left for another 
more complete examination. This is the willingness of broad good faith courts to base 
their analysis on authority which is not authoritative. The In re Doersam opinion bases 
its holding on dicta from a previous case. Id. at 239. A court may be excused from 
elevating its own dicta to ratio dicidendi. However, it is distressing that the referenced 
authority was a federal district court in another circuit. Id. Although it is true that the 
6th Circuit merely references the foreign case (appending a "see, e.g." tag), the district 
court case is still the only authority which is cited for the proposition that the "plan good 
faith" analysis is too narrow. Id. Particularly in the absence of any attempt to cite a 
close reading of the statute or legislative history, this weak citation highlights the void 
of authority. For a more extreme example of this conduct, see infra note 159. 
130. In re Sotter, 28 B.R. 201 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983) (emphasizing that the 
genesis of major debt was criminal conduct). · 
131. See Schaffner v. I.R.S., 95 B.R. 62 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988). 
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plan to make full payment of her debt, and if the debtor refuses, then 
justifies the court in lifting the stay.132 Other courts boldly state that 
no plan will be confirmed whose confirmation would result in discharge 
of debts incurred by intentional fraud133--although this restriction is 
absent from § 1325(a)(3). 
Courts are not alone in basing their good faith analysis on the origin 
of liability in pre-plan conduct. Scholars do the same. The language 
from one article is typical: "The discharge of debts which result from 
illegal activity is not consistent with the meaning of good faith or the 
intent of Congress to provide a remedy to adjust debts for the honest but 
unfortunate debtor."134 This argument is patently circular. According 
to this argument, the meaning of "good faith" in the statute cannot mean 
what the statute says-i.e., good faith in proposing the plan. The 
meaning of good faith must therefore depend on what Congress intended 
(rather than what Congress explicitly wrote in the statute). The 
argument then asserts that the discharge of the particular kind of liability 
at issue cannot be consistent with "good faith" because the writer 
interprets Congressional intent to be something other than what is stated 
in the statute. This argument begins and ends with a denial of the words 
of the statute. Of course, neither courts nor writers cite any textual 
authority for this argument, because circular arguments are, by defini-
tion, self-referential. 
In the consideration of pre-filing conduct, the courts' behavior differs 
significantly from the cautious approach they espouse. Courts claim to 
approach pre-filing conduct judiciously, considering it as only one of 
many factors in determining good faith. However, the results belie this 
claim of restraint. Almost without exception, when courts examine pre-
filing conduct, this conduct determines the outcome of their analysis. 
b. Non-dischargeability of the Liability in Chapter 7 
When discussing pre-plan conduct, courts often refer to conduct which 
would have barred discharge had the case been filed in Chapter 7. In 
Doersam, for example, the court takes special note of "whether the debt 
would be non-dischargeable under Chapter 7 [as] a factor which is 
132. In re Baez, 106 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1989). 
133. In re Kem II, 40 B.R. 26 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Terry, 9 B.R. 314 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1981). 
134. Daniel G. Chadwick, In re Prine: Good Faith, Dischargeability and 
Conversion.from a Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 115, 120 
(1983). 
464 
[VOL. 34: 439, 1997] Chapter 13 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
relevant to the determination of good faith."135 The court, like the 
scholar previously cited, may focus on debts which arise from illegality, 
which are nondischargeable in Chapter 7 through the provisions of 
§ 523(a). Such considerations are typical of the courts undertaking a 
broad good faith analysis. 
Courts undertaking a broad good faith analysis argue that 
"nondischargeable debts", 136 which are the kind of debts for which a 
Chapter 13 discharge is sought, would not be discharged in a Chapter 7 
action: Therefore, these debts should not be discharged in a Chapter 13 
action. This argument begins with the assertion that the purpose of 
Chapter 13 is repayment, not discharge. To justify this assertion the 
courts often refer to the legislative history, in the guise of a quotation 
from one of the many sources of legislative intent: 
The new chapter 13 ... provide[s] a simple yet precise and effective system for 
individuals to pay debts under bankruptcy court protection and supervision. The 
new chapter 13 will permit almost any individual . . . to propose and have 
approved a reasonable plan for debt repa~ent . . . . As in current law, 100 
percent payment plans will be encouraged. 137 
The legislative history is voluminous; proof that the legislative intent 
was to require payment need not have been made by the quoted 
language. Many other portions of the legislative history might have 
been chosen to exemplify this argument. 138 However, asserting that 
135. State of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d 
237, 239, 240 (6th Cir. 1988). 
136. Although these opinions-and even dissenting court's opinions---refer to 
"nondischargeable" claims, these claims are in fact not nondischargeable in Chapter 13. 
Non-dischargeability in Chapter 7 is based on the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) 
(1996), imported by 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1995) into Chapter 7. The same 11 U.S.C 
§ 523(a) exceptions to discharge are absent from the Chapter 13 section on discharge, 
11 U.S.C. § 1328(1994). 11 U.S.C. § 523 is not completely absent, however; 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1328(a)(2) refers to specific subsections as excepted from the Chapter 13 discharge. 
Clearly Congress did not forget about 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) when it wrote 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1328; members of Congress merely chose not to except from Chapter 13 discharge 
most of what was nondischargeable in Chapter 7. Therefore these claims are not 
nondischargeable in the Chapter 13 context. 
137. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 A.S.C.C.A.N. 5787 
[hereinafter S.R. 989]. 
138. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 [hereinafter H.R. 595] (''The purpose of Chapter 13 is to enable an 
individual . . . to develop and perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts over 
an extended period. In some cases, the plan will call for repayment. In others, it may 
offer creditors a percentage of their claims in full settlement."); S.R. 989, supra note 
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these passages represent the sum total of "legislative intent" ignores 
contrary provisions which would prove that the intent of Congress was 
not to secure payment for the creditor but rather to secure a broad 
discharge139 or a fresh start for the debtor.140 
Whatever the basis for the nondischargeability argument in legislative 
history, the courts emphasize that debtors should not be able to use 
Chapter 13 to discharge what is nondischargeable in Chapter 7 .. For this 
reason, the type of debt which a Chapter 13 debtor seeks to discharge 1s 
germane to the question of good faith. 141 If the debts sought to be 
discharged in Chapter 13 are found to be nondischargeable under chapter 
7, the Chapter 13 action will probably be found to have been filed in 
bad faith. Thus, Chapter 13 is held not to be properly used for the sole 
purpose of discharging "nondischargeable debt."142 This is particularly 
true if the nondischargeable act approaches the level of an intentional 
137, at 141 ("Chapter 13 is designed to serve as a flexible vehicle fodhe repayment of 
part or all of the allowed claims of the debtor"); S.R. 989, supra note 137, at 12 ("In 
theory, the basic purpose of Chapter XIII has been to permit an individual to pay his 
debts and avoid [liquidation or straight] bankruptcy by making periodic payments to a 
trustee under bankruptcy court protection, with the trustee fairly distributing the funds 
deposited to creditors until all debts have been paid."). 
139. For example, tucked into the provisions on Liquidation for the Consumer 
Debtor is the language: "In reorganization and individual repayment plan cases, the 
existence of circumstances that would bar discharge, such as misconduct or the six-year 
bar, will not be a bar to confirmation of a plan." R.R. 595, supra note 138, at 129. A 
footnote further elucidates this sentence by referring to ''proposed 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 
1141, 1325, 1328." Id. This language, particularly with the clarifying footnote, makes 
it clear that Congress intended that 11 U.S.C. § 523 not apply to Chapter 13. 
Furthermore, the House Report describes discharge as "[p]erhaps the most important 
element of the fresh start for a consumer debtor after bankruptcy". R.R. 595, supra note 
138, at 128. The House Report notes that "the discharge, with the release from creditor 
collection attempts," is one of the most important aspects of the fresh start. Id. at 125. 
140. See, e.g., R.R. 595, supra note 138, at 118 ("[B]ankruptcy relief should be 
effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh start."); id. ("[T]he debtor is given 
adequate exemptions and other protection to ensure that bankruptcy will provide a fresh 
start"); id. at 125 ("The two most important aspects of the fresh start available under the 
Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return to normal life, and 
the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts," id. at 126 ("[T]here 
is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out with 
adequate possessions to begin his fresh start. . . . Thus, the bill . . . enunciates a 
bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start''). · 
141. See State of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 
F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Circle Management Services, Inc. v. Wright (In re 
Wright) 36 B.R. 663 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (finding that if the debtor meets the 
minimum statutory requirements, her good faith is not determined by her contribution, 
and that the nature of her debts must be considered only if nominal repayment is 
contemplated). 
142. In re Schaitz, 913 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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tort or criminal activity.143 A minority of courts claim that the 
nondischargeability issue is only one of many factors to be considered, 
and is not, therefore, conclusive evidence of bad faith. 144 For most 
broad good faith courts, however, if there is an intent to discharge debt 
under Chapter 13 which would be nondischargeable under Chapter 7, the 
plan will likely be found to have been filed in bad faith. 145 The courts 
which dissent from this position represent a very small minority.146 
c. Abuse of Provisions of the Code 
When courts engaging in a broad good faith inquiry examine pre-
petition conduct and the potential Chapter 7 dischargeability of debts, 
they stray from the field apparently prescribed by the explicit words of 
the Bankruptcy Code. Yet these examinations maintain some loose 
nexus with bankruptcy law. Many courts, however, further assert that 
the very election by a debtor of Chapter 13 's provisions can be an abuse 
143. For examples of garden variety nondischargeable debt, see In re Schaitz, 913 
F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Ross, 95 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Olp, 
29 B.R. 932 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983). For examples of criminal and tortious conduct, 
see Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Thomas, 
118 B.R. 421 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1990); In re Kourtakis, 75 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1987); In re Todd, 65 B.R. 249 (Bankr. N.D.111. 1986); In re Brock, 47 B.R. 167 (Bankr. 
S.D. Cal. 1985); for examples of fraud -0r misrepresentation, see Pioneer Bank of 
Longhart v. Rasmusen (In re Rasmussen), 888 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Boyd, 
57 B.R. 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Troyer, 24 B.R. 727 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1982). 
144. See Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990); In re 
Doersam, 849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Vensel, 39 B.R. 866 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1984); In re Ali, 33 B.R. 890 (Bankr. D.Kan. 1983) (retreating from In re McMinn, 4 
B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) and In re Garcia, 6 B.R. 35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980)); In 
re Miller, 24 B.R. 786 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Graves, 19 B.R. 402 (Bankr. La. 
1982); In re Minor,16 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Meltzer, 11 B.R. 624 
(Bankr. N.Y. 1981); U.S. Life Credit v. Carter (In re Carter), 9 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1981); G.F.C. Consumer Discount Co. v. Scott (In re Scott), 7 B.R. 692 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1980). 
145. See In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489 (Bankr. D. Pa. 1995); In re Smith, 848 F.2d. 
813 (7th Cir. 1988); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1986), on remand In 
re Freeman, 66 B.R. 610 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986). 
146. For such opinions, see .In re Chaffin, 836 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988); In re 
Farley, 114 B.R. 711 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990); In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ind. 1989); In re Riggleman, 76 B.R. 111 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Kem, 40 B.R. 
26 (Bankr. D. N.Y. 1984); Overland Park Dodge, Inc. v. Graff(In re Graff), 7 B.R. 426 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1980). 
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of the purposes of the Code. These courts provide the greatest insight 
into what motivates the broad good faith courts. 
The "abuse of the provisions of the Code" reasoning must be carefully 
distinguished from the examination by the plan good faith courts of the 
debtor's conduct within bankruptcy. The plan good faith courts examine 
how the debtor treated the procedures and requirements of the Code and 
the directives of the bankruptcy court. They conclude that an uncooper-
ative debtor may lack the good faith required by the Code. The "abuse 
of the provisions of the Code" courts assert that the act of electing the 
remedies of Chapter 13 is itself evidence of bad faith. 
This odd assertion shares one key presumption with the pre-plan 
conduct analysis and nondischargeability arguments: that the statute 
cannot mean what it appears to say. The broad good faith courts argue 
that the statute could not have meant that the courts must ignore conduct 
prior to the proposal of the plan, nor that Congress intended to allow the 
discharge of liability under one chapter which would be 
nondischargeable under another section. It is but a small further step to 
argue that although the Code permits a Chapter 13 discharge, election of 
the discharge is an abuse of the Code. 
Many courts explicitly refer to Chapter 7 iti determining that the filing 
of Chapter 13 was abusive, and therefore, not made in good faith. These 
courts reason that an abuse of the Code occurs when a debtor attempts 
to use the provisions of Chapter 13 as a substitute for the provisions of 
Chapter 7----at least, when the principal motive is to circumvent 
exceptions to discharge rather than make meaningful payments147 of 
debt. 148 Courts espousing this view take particular umbrage when they 
believe that the Chapter 13 action was filed to avoid the restrictions of 
Chapter 7. 149 
147. The "meaningful payments" language reflects a long-standing and energetic 
debate about whether a debtor had to pay a certain percentage of his unsecured debt in 
order to reach the "good faith" threshold. Courts mandating certain percentages fell 
within the broad good faith c~p, both in their willingness to read this requirement into 
the Code, and in their unwillingness to read the Code's Chapter 13 discharge provisions 
literally. Congress, however, resolved the debate by amending 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) in 
1984, to provide a payment standard. 
The "meaningful payments" requirement, although apparently contrary to it, is clearly 
an addition to the Code. Nevertheless, for a reasoned and sympathetic apology for 
inserting the requirement, see In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) 
(examining several zero payment Chapter 13 plans and arguing that the Code, as drafted, 
. is out of balance because creditors are not represented and that the court, by ''reading 
in" necessary requirements, must bring the Code back into balance). 
148. In re Satterwhite, 7 B.R 39 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980). 
149. See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 102 B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Ok. 1988); In re Meltzer, 
11 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1981). 
468 
[VOL. 34: 439, 1997] Chapter 13 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Other courts simply posit that the use of Chapter 13 's broad discharge 
provisions is a manipulation of the ''technicalities" of the Code and 
therefore not made in good faith. These courts argue that good faith 
requires more than technical compliance with the statute. These courts 
require of the debtor good faith and honesty of purpose. They focus on 
the debtor's state of mind.1so These courts, therefore, feel themselves 
entitled to weigh the true intention of the debtor against the literal 
reading of the statute. When a literal application of "best interests of 
creditors" test would result in the discharge of a substantial obligation, 
these courts feel justified in ignoring the literal provisions of the 
statute.1s1 Where a Chapter 13 action was used to execute a "real 
purpose" of giving the debtors the opportunity to spread attorney fee 
payments over sixteen months, the court held that election of Chapter 13 
was "an abuse of the spirit and purpose" of the chapter despite the 
debtor's compliance with the words of the Code.1s2 "[W]here [a] 
debtor's primary and overriding purpose [was] to manipulate Chapter 13 
as a device to escape nearly all of his liability," a Chapter 13 plan 
should not, according to these courts, be confirmed, even if the debtor 
fulfilled the "technical requirements" of the statute.1s3 The technically 
correct use of Chapter 13 in such a way that the plan violates the 
underlying policy of "securing an orderly and fair adjustment of the 
relationship between debtor and creditors" does not satisfy the good faith 
requirement.154 
The broad good faith courts have traveled far beyond what the statute 
authorizes. Admittedly, the conduct of some debtors has been so abusive 
of bankruptcy protection as to give the courts some excuse for this 
expansive inquiry. In one case, the debtors used Chapter 13 for the 
"greedy and unworthy purpose" of rejecting an option agreement they 
felt was not sufficiently profitable.1ss The court understandably found 
150. In re Hawes, 73 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987). 
151. In re Sotter, 28 B.R. 201 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983). 
152. In re San Miguel, 40 B.R. 481, 485, 486 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984). 
153. In re Norman, 162 B.R. 581, 583 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993). 
154. In re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996, 1000 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (quoting Northwest 
Place Ltd. v. Cooper (In re Northwest Place Ltd.), 108 B.R. 809, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1988)) (emphasis omitted). ' 
155. Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936, 941 (11th Cir. 1986), 
cert. dismissed, 478 U.S. 1028 (1986). 
469 
that stratagem to demonstrate a lack of good faith, although the technical 
requirements of the statute were arguably fulfilled. 156 
Most often, however, the courts label as "abuse" a use of the statute 
to reach an end disapproved by the court. A Chapter 13 debtor's 
attempt to avoid a large debt to a former employer that resulted from 
"betrayal of a close personal relationship," breach of trust and felonious 
conduct was considered to be an unfair manipulation of the code, ~57 
even though § 1325(a) allows the discharge of these very claims. 
The proposition that a person manipulates a statute by electing to do 
what the statute on its face and by its history specifically allows, is 
shocking. What motivates a court of law to take such an extreme 
position? A search for the real motivating principle in the broad good 
faith cases reveals that beneath the surface discussions of pre-plan 
conduct, dischargeability, or abuse of the provisions of the Code, lies the 
court's moral judgement of the debtor and an expression of its moral 
outrage. 
What is truly at issue in these cases is whether or not the judge is 
outraged by the debtor's actions prior to seeking bankruptcy protection. 
In cases in which an act is so reprehensible that the court refuses to be 
a party to discharge the liability, the court searches for an excuse in the 
debtor's past and then justifies its decision in "good faith" terms, without 
regard to compliance with the statute. In In re LeMaire, 158 the Eighth 
Circuit reacts so violently to a liability that arose from an intentional 
shooting that it vents its outrage several times in the opinion. In 
overturning a district court's :finding of "good faith," the court refers, 
without being specific, to trial evidence, public policy, pre-plan conduct, 
and the maliciousness of the injury. The court fails to explain how the 
Code authorizes inquiry into these factors in the good faith analysis. 159 
156. Id. 
157. In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710, 725 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993). 
158. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990). 
159. Id. at 1348, 1349. The Lemaire opinion provides a fascinating example of the 
court's willingness to rely on authority which is not authoritative. See discussion supra 
note 129. The LeMaire court apparently faced a quandary between a debtor whom the 
court was not willing to allow to pass over the "good faith" hurdle, and the court's own 
precedent which appeared to prevent the application of a broad good faith inquiry. The 
Eighth Circuit's own opinion in In re Estus countenanced the laundry list/totality of the 
circumstances approach. 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982). The "totality of circumstances" 
approach would have made the denial of good faith easier for the LeMaire court. The 
court, however, could not easily use Estus. In re Lemaire, 898. F.2d at 1349. After 
Estus, in 1984, Congress amended 11 U.S.C. § 1325, adding§ 1325(b). Id. The Eighth 
Circuit followed the amendment with its opinion in Education Assistance Corp. v. 
Zellner (In re Zellner), 827 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987). Zellner held that the effect of 
the statutory amendment was to limit the focus of the Estus inquiry to a plan good faith 
inquiry: i.e., whether the d~btor stated his financial condition accurately, whether she 
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The Court of Appeal's lengthy and detailed dissent emphasizes that the 
majority's claims are hollow and lack foundation in bankruptcy history, 
legal precedent, or in the wording of the statute. This dissent makes the 
majority's rush to judgment all the more obvious. 
The Eighth Circuit is not alone in acting on its outrage by failing to 
find "good faith." In In re Caldwell, 160 the Sixth Circuit scolded a 
debtor who tried to discharge a judgment arising from false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The opinion overflows 
with moral outrage, speaking of chapter 13 as a "salvation,"161 while 
contrasting the debtor's "veiled" intentions162 and his ''unbroken 
pattern of deceit and delay."163 The opinion ends with an emphatic 
moral judgment: "Caldwell is not the type of debtor whom the bankrupt-
cy laws were meant to protect."164 The court based its finding of bad 
faith, in part, on thid debtor's noncooperation with bankruptcy proce-
dure; but the determinative factor was "what he has done since the 
judgment to avoid paying it."165 
The outrage evident in these opinions is best exemplified bl the Sixth 
Circuit's statements in Memphis Bank & Trust v. Whitman: 1 
Obviously the liberal provisions of the new Chapter 13 are subject to abuse, and 
courts must look closely at the debtor's conduct before confirming a plan. We 
should not allow a debtor to obtain money, services or products from a seller 
by larceny, fraud or other forms of dishonesty and then keep his gain by filing 
a Chapter 13 petition within a few days of the wrong. To allow the debtor to 
engaged in fraud or misrepresentation in the bankruptcy court, and so forth. Id. at 1227. 
Thus, if the Eighth Circuit were to follow its own opinion in Zellner, it would find it 
more difficult to withhold a "good faith" finding to LeMaire. The court avoids this 
difficulty through the judicial equivalent of a half gainer with a double twist: the 
LeMaire opinion cites a Seventh Circuit interpretation of the Eighth Circuit's own 
Zellner opinion to prove that Zellner actually preserved the "totality of the circumstanc-
es" approach that in fact Zellner actually disapproved. In re LeMaire, 898 F.2d at 1349 
(citing In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813, 820 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988)). Thus, in essence, the Eighth 
Circuit relies on a misinterpretation of its own precedent by another circuit court of 
appeals in order to invalidate its own precedent. In one way or another, these are the 
kinds of gymnastics which the broad good faith courts often exhibit. 
160. Caldwell v. Hardin (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990). 
161. Id. at 1126. 
·162. Id. 
163. Id. at 1127. 
164. Id. at 1128 (emphasis added). 
165. Id. at 1127. 
166. 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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profit from his own wrong In this way through the Chapter 13 process runs the 
risk of turning otherwise honest consumers and shopkeepers into knaves. 161 
The courts must not only protect the Code and their jurisdiction, but 
must also, apparently protect the debtors from their own evil inclination 
toward sin and knavery. 
These courts are not isolated proponents of a discredited philosophy. 
Courts across the country and from different circuits have transformed 
their outrage over the acts giving rise to liability into justification for a 
finding of bad faith. 168 Judges are not shy about admitting that their 
outrage is a significant factor; the occasional judge will reveal his 
reasoning outside the scope of a written opinion.169 
Although the broad good faith analysis is the dominant approach, and 
the "abuse of the Code" justification is a strong theme within that 
analysis, a few courts dissent from it. These courts maintain that a debtor 
may file a plan which fulfills the good faith requirement, even though 
debts were incurred by pre-petition bad faith. 170 A few judges remind 
their colleagues that a court should not let reprehensible conduct distract 
it from its analysis of whether there is good faith in proposing the plan. 
One opinion warns: "Care must be taken not to allow revulsion over a 
debtor's past deeds to detract from or impair a finding of good faith 
167. Id. at 432 (emphasis added). 
168. See In re Kourtakis, 75 B.R. 183 (Banlcr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (finding that debtor 
does not demonstrate requisite honesty of intentions given nature of criminal act giving 
rise to the liability); In re Brock, 47 B.R. 167 (Banlcr. S.D. Cal. 1985) (noting that the 
motivation of debtor was to escape the consequences of repayment, and, in apparent 
contradistinction, that the Code is intended to relieve the "honest debtor''); In re Troyer, 
24 B.R. 727 (Banlcr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (basing a "lack of good faith" ruling on language 
about the "dishonest debtor," as though pre-petition conduct proved that the debtor was 
in some continuing way dishonest and, therefore had not earned a finding of good faith). 
169. In a discussion about Chapter 11 good faith, bankruptcy judge William 
Greendyke said that bad faith is "a matter of how offended the bankruptcy judge is that 
these parties are in front of him or her and whether or not the judge decides that the case 
is one that is susceptible of reorganization." Roundtable Discussion, Good Faith: A 
Roundtable Discussion, I AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 11, 23 (1993). Judge Greendyke 
then reviewed the laundry list of factors prescribed for the good faith analysis----one not 
dissimilar from the Chapter 13 list--ruid concluded: "If the case is so egregious, if you 
will, that one factor outweighs all the others, you just need to consider all the remaining 
factors or to look at their potential application to make sure of your decision. It is 
appropriate to give different weight to the various factors." Id. at 24. As noted above, 
it is commonly said that the good faith requirement in Chapter 11 is essentially the same 
as in Chapter 13. There is no reason to believe that this judge's opinion is immaterial 
here, nor that his opinion is particularly radical. None of the other panelists objected to 
his remarks as being extraordinary. Id. passim. 
I 70. In re Eppers, 38 B.R. 301 (Banlcr. N.M. 1984); Margrafv. Oliver, 28 B.R. 420 
(Banlcr. S.D. Ohio 1983). See also United States v. Verdunn, 187 B.R. 996 (Banlcr. 
M.D. Fla. 1995), rev'd, 89 F. 3d 799 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489 
(Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1995). 
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where that debtor is making an effort to satisfy past obligations to the 
extent possible and still embark upon a fresh start."171 More concisely, 
one court notes the tortured interpretations mentioned above and 
pointedly remarks: "This Court's dissatisfaction with the result [ of a plan 
good faith analysis] is not a sufficient ground to support a conclusion 
that the debtor's plan is not proposed in good faith."172 
Nevertheless, the broad good faith analysis remains the majority 
approach. The words of the statute do not limit these courts' approach. 
Pre-plan conduct, nondischargeability, and abuse of the Code are all laid 
open to the broad good faith courts' inquiry. 
Iv. OUT OF THE CODE AND INTO MORALITY 
The broad good faith courts undertake a broad inquiry into the 
debtor's conduct and intentions. I shall first examine the inquiry itself, 
and in particular the moral language used by these courts. Next, because 
the bankruptcy courts often claim that the authority for their actions 
arises from their status as courts of equity, I consider the traditional 
orientation of courts of equity. Finally, I examine the purposes of a 
code and the role of predictability in commercial law, and ask whether 
the broad good faith courts satisfy these purposes. 
A. A Moral Inquiry 
What connects pre-plan conduct, nondischargeability in Chapter 7, 
abuse of the provisions of the Code, and outrage over pre-plan conduct? 
Something must, for these considerations characterize the analysis of 
courts which seem driven to find a lack of good faith. What distinguish-
es these considerations from considerations of good faith in proposing 
the plan itself? Again, something must distinguish the two different sets 
of considerations, because courts which consider the first set of factors 
seldom invoke deficiencies in the plan itself. 
In fact, the distinction between broad good faith and plan good faith 
has remarkable implications. One would expect that courts applying 
171. In re Chura, 33 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). See also In re Belt, 
106 B.R. 553, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (citing In re Chura, 33 B.R. 558, 560, and 
adding the caution that "[o]nly where there is a showing of serious debtor misconduct 
or abuse should a chapter 13 case be found lacking good faith."). 
172. In re Farley, 114 B.R. 711,716 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990). 
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neutral principles to the same statute would reach roughly similar results. 
Yet this is not the case. An examination of the case law reveals that a 
court that approaches a Chapter 13 plan with a broad good faith strategy 
is almost twice as likely to find a lack of good faith as is a court which 
applies a plan good faith inquiry.173 
There are various possible hypotheses that might elucidate an 
organizing principle. One hypothesis is that the cases exhibit successive 
waves of interpretation and reaction, and thus the real explanation behind 
these cases is an historical one.174 Another theory is that there is a 
disagreement not over the meaning of good faith, but rather over 
whether the "manifest intent" of the statute is repayment, 175 dis-
173. The results of the two different approaches are startling. In the approximately 
200 cases reviewed by the author, see supra note 9, where courts adopted a broad good 
faith approach, they declined to find that the Chapter 13 plan was proposed in good faith 
in 87% of the cases. Yet where courts adopted a plan good faith approach, they declined 
to find good faith in only 46% of the cases. These are preliminary findings which must 
await a formal statistical analysis. Of course, the normal disclaimers about statistical 
sampling must apply. 
174. There seem to be three distinct epochs. In the beginning, the courts read the 
statute closely and interpreted it literally. See, e.g., Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. 
(In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) ("(W]here the statute is silent, courts 
should not read into the Act any per se limitations .... "); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 
968 (4th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ravenot v. 
Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982). This gave way to a period 
during the middle and late l980's in which courts espoused the broad good faith inquiry 
in order to stop perceived abuses of the statute. See, e.g., State of Ohio, Student Loan 
Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988). This period in tum 
seems to be slowly giving way to confusion, a confusion in which a minority of courts 
have retreated to the words of the statute. This minority is lead by cases such as In re 
Farley, 114 B.R. 711 (Banlcr. S.D. Cal. 1990), buttressed by language in recent Supreme 
Court banlcruptcy rulings: Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991), Toibb v. 
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991), and Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992). 
This historical/evolutionary description does not explain, however, why some courts 
continue to cling to the broad good faith inquiry at its most radical. Many cases, even 
after the clear "strict construction" message sent by the recent Supreme Court cases, 
continue the broad good faith analysis. See, e.g., In re Allard, 196 B.R. 402 (Banlcr. 
N.D. Ill. 1996) (continuing the broad good faith analysis contrary to the statute, years 
after the Supreme Court indicated that such an extra-statutory approach was inappropri-
ate). See also In re Norman, 162 B.R. 581 (Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 1993). 
175. For support for the proposition that Congress' main intent in the Banlcruptcy 
Code was to require (or allow) repayment of the debtor's debts, see H.R. 595, supra note 
138, at ll8 ("The purpose of Chapter 13 is to enable an individual ... to develop and 
perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts over an extended period. In some 
cases, the plan will call for full repayment. In others, it may offer creditors a percentage 
of their claims in full settlement."); S. R. 989, supra note 137, at 141 ("Chapter 13 is 
designed to serve as a flexible vehicle for the repayment of part or all of the allowed 
claim of the debtor."); id. at 12 ("In theory, the basic purpose of Chapter XIII has been 
to permit an individual to pay his debts and avoid [liquidation or straight] banlcruptcy 
by making periodic payments to a trustee under banlcruptcy court protection, with the 
trustee fairly distributing the funds deposited to creditors until all debts have been 
paid."); id. at 13 ("The new chapter 13 ... provide[s] a simple yet precise and effective 
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charge,176 or even a fresh start.177 From this vantage point, the un-
derlying conflict in the cases could be understood as resulting from 
different interpretations of legislative history.178 A cynic might 
maintain that the true debate is over ends and means: If the end 
produced by a literal reading of the statute is abhorrent, can the court 
system for individuals to pay debts under bankruptcy court protection and supervision. 
The new chapter 13 will permit almost any individual ... to propose and have approved 
a reasonable plan for debt repayment . . . . As in current law, 100 percent payment 
plans will be encouraged."). 
I 76. For support for the proposition that Congress' principal intention was to grant 
the debtor a broad discharge, see H.R. 595, supra note 138, at 129 ("In reorganization 
and individual repayment plan cases, the existence of circumstances that would bar 
discharge, such as misconduct or the six year bar, will not be a bar to confirmation of 
a plan.") Id. at 129 n. 71 (proving by the language of this footnote, which refers to 
"proposed 11 U.S.C. [§§] 1129, 1141, 1325, 1328," and which is tucked into provisions 
on Liquidation for the Consumer Debtor, that the statute meant precisely what it says: 
that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) provisions were not to apply in Chapter 13); id. at 128 ("Perhaps 
the most important element of the fresh start for a consumer debtor after bankruptcy is 
discharge."); id. at 125 ("The two most important aspects of the fresh start available 
under the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return to normal 
life, and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts."). 
177. For support for the proposition that the actual intention of Congress was to 
procure a fresh start for the debtor, see H.R 595, supra note 138, at 118 ("[B]ankruptcy 
relief should be effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh start."); id. "[T]he 
debtor is given adequate exemptions and other protection to ensure that bankruptcy will 
provide a fresh start."); id. at 125 ("The two most important aspects of the fresh start 
available under the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return 
to normal life, and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts."); 
id. at 126 ("[T]here is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through 
bankruptcy comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start."); id. (''Thus, 
the bill ... enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start."). 
178. One of the most interesting parts of the debate is that the actual nonexistence 
of legislative history as an authoritative text is never mentioned. The content of 
legislative history is discussed; the primacy or exclusivity of different themes is debated; 
various portions of the legislative record are contrasted against other arguably weaker 
portions. Yet nobody mentions that which is obvious throughout the review of the 
legislative history: that there is no unified, · internally consistent text which "is" 
legislative history. The House and Senate reports are each internally inconsistent and 
mutually contradictory. Portions of each report concurrently support opposing positions 
while also supporting third positions. This cannot be surprising, because the legislative 
history, like the statute itself, is the product of legislative compromise and bargaining, 
and the scars of these battles and their resolutions appear in the legislative reports. 
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, legislative history does not exist to resolve the "intent 
of Congress" debate, nor to provide an answer to the question: What is good faith? Its 
nonexistence, however, does not prevent it from being cited. 
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vary the interpretation of the plain words of the statute179 or must it 
defer to the legislature?180 
None of these hypotheses, however, answer the question of what 
motivates the broad good faith courts in their acrobatic attempts to deny 
a good faith finding. Talcing the language of the broad good faith 
opinions seriously, the conclusion that morality is what drives the broad 
good faith inquiry is difficult to avoid.181 Both the broad good faith 
179. For the leading exponent of this view, see Memphis Bank & Trust v. Whitman, 
in which the Sixth Circuit in 1982 wrote: 
[T]his subsection[§ 1352(a)(3)] says only that the wage earner plan must be 
'proposed' in good faith, not that the debt in question be incurred in good 
faith .... The 'good faith' requirement is neither defined in the Bankruptcy 
Code nor discussed in the legislative history. The phrase should, therefore, be 
interpreted in light of the structure and general purposes of Chapter 13. 
Obviously the liberal provisions of the new Chapter 13 are subject to abuse, 
and courts must look closely at the debtor's conduct before confirming a plan. 
We should not allow a debtor to obtain money, services or products from a 
seller by larceny, fraud or other forms of dishonesty and then keep his gain by 
filing a Chapter 13 petition within a few days of the wrong. To allow the 
debtor to profit from his own wrong in this way through the Chapter 13 
process runs the risk of turning otherwise honest consumers and shopkeepers 
into knaves. The view that the Bankruptcy Court should not consider the 
debtor's pre-plan conduct in incurring the debt appears to give too narrow an 
interpretation to the good faith requirement. 
692 F.2d 427,431, 432. See also In re Boyd, 57 B.R. 410,411 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) 
("Congress [did] not wish the Bankruptcy Code to be a haven for criminal offenders and 
has stated that the criminal actions . . . may proceed under the exception granted by 
§ 362(b)(l) to the automatic stay .... ") . 
.180. The most articulate proponent of restraint is In re Farley, in which the court 
states: 
As much as this Court believes that debts nondischargeable under Chapter 7 
should be discharged under Chapter 13 only if paid through the plan, that is 
for the Congress to provide, not the judiciary. . . . Notwithstanding the 
convictions of this Court about the inequitable result which obtains in a case 
such as this, this Court is compelled to conclude that the plan as proposed 
should be confirmed .... This Court's dissatisfaction with the result is not a 
sufficient ground to support a conclusion that the debtor's plan is not proposed 
in good faith. It is for the Congress to redress what this Court perceives as a 
flaw in the statutory scheme of Chapter 13. 
114 B.R. 711, 715-16 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990). 
As discussed supra note 174, three recent Supreme Court cases appear to support the 
Farley position. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); Toibb v. 
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992). 
181. I do not wish to create a new school of legal analysis when I suggest that the 
proper inquiry for aberrant opinions is not, "What does the law say?", but rather, "To 
what use is a particular idea put?" On the one hand, the case study method taught in 
law school presumes that courts used sound legal reasoning. Based on this premise, with 
the process of reasoning rendered transparent, law students are encouraged to derive 
rules from the cases. After law school, lawyers are seldom encouraged to ask whether 
a particular line of reasoning ''makes sense." On the other hand, radical approaches to 
the law, such as the Marxist and other ideologically based analyses, reach such absurd 
results (in reaching for hidden agendas) that they thereby warn us of the danger of 
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courts and the plan good faith courts, in their criticisms of their more 
expansive colleagues, recognize that this is the real motivating factor. 
The broad good faith courts' define good faith in terms saturated with 
morality. Good faith is described as full and complete disclosure and 
honesty of purpose. 182 The subjective intention of the debtor (not his 
objective conduct) is one of the factors in the broad good faith 
analysis, 183 and is often the only factor considered in judging good 
faith. 184 Such courts do not find anything odd in describing the good 
faith inquiry in terms that seem to leap out of the story of the expulsion 
from Eden: ''the 'good faith' requirement of§ 1325(a) is the only safety 
valve available through which plans attempting to twist the law to 
malevolent ends may be cast out."185 
In fact, many of the broad good faith courts emphasize that they are 
judging the debtor's moral status, not her objective conduct. These 
courts rail against false intentions, deceit and delay, 186 frustration of 
straying too far from this presumption of proper reasoning. Yet the presumption of 
propriety does not help us to understand why a court might employ specious reasoning. 
The functional approach that I suggest does answer this question because this approach 
asks what motivates a court to pick a particular tool. 
Take legislative history as an example. Random choice does not dictate that a broad 
good faith court will choose a ''payment" portion of the congressional record, nor that 
a plan good faith court will choose an equally authoritative "discharge" portion of the 
record. Rather, these portions of the record are tools that build particular structures. 
They are tools chosen specifically because they build a particular structure. The real 
question, therefore, must be functional: What function does this particular piece ( of 
evidence, argument, or legislative history) serve in the court's reasoning? It is only 
through this approach that one can understand the contortions of opinions like that of the 
LeMaire court, supra notes 158, 159. Without such an approach to those tortured 
decisions, one must either dismiss the opinions as aberrant or (even worse!) accept the 
opinions as proper legal discourse. In either case, one cannot learn anything about what 
motivates the courts or what deep structures might underlie apparently inexplicable 
results. 
182. In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Graves, 19 B.R. 402 
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1982); In re Wiggles, 7 B.R. 373 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). 
183. In re Stein, 36 B.R. 521 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983). 
184. In re Schaitz, 913 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Fawcett, 758 F.2d 588 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865 (2nd Cir. 
1983); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 20 B.R. 642 (E.D. Ark. 1982); 
Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
185. Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(quoting In re Leal, 7 B.R. 245, 248 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980)). 
186. Caldwell v. Hardin (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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fair dealing,187 lack of remorse,188 impenitence,189 and of course, 
knavery. 190 
The clearest example of this expanding moral overlay is the "honest 
debtor" language that inexplicably appears in the cases. Courts and 
commentators often use the term "honest debtor," exclusively to deny 
the blessings of "good faith" to a debtor. The assertion that only an 





Bankruptcy is designed to protect an honest debtor; 
The debtor is not an honest debtor if she attempts to discharge what 
would be a nondischargeable liability (or discharge with minimum 
payments, or whatever it is that the writer objects to); 
Therefore, no matter what the statute says, the Bankruptcy statute can't 
protect this debtor. 
This reasoning appears in several cases, but always as subtext. Because 
the phrase "honest debtor" is used with such authority, this writer 
conducted an extensive review of the legislative history to determine its 
origin. 
The origin of the "honest debtor" is mysterious. The language may 
have gained currency from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 191 a 1934 Supreme 
Court case interpreting the Bankruptcy Act: 
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to "relieve the honest 
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start 
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business 
misfortunes." Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-555. This 
purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being 
of public as well as private interest. in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate 
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property he owns at the time of 
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unham-
pered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt. . . . The new 
opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is the purpose 
of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor. . .. 192 
187. In re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994). 
188. In re Kourtakis, 75 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) ("[A]lthough 
Kourtakis has some remorse, it is apparent from his testimony that the i:emorse is not 
complete by any means."). 
189. Id. ("Clearly, Kourtakis does not accept the full measure of the verdict against 
him and has filed this bankruptcy in substantial part to effect a reduction of the verdict. 
Kourtakis's intentions in this regard are thus not entirely honest."). 
190. See Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427,431,432 (6th Cir. 
1982), supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
191. 292 U.S. 234 (1934). 
192. Id. at 244-245 (emphasis omitted). 
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Numerous Code cases have adopted this argument.193 Many writers 
have also focussed on this language, alluding to "honest debtors" as 
though it were a term originating with Congress: 
Congress enacted Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Code) to 
encourage the honest but unfortunate debtor to make greater use of composition 
in bankruptcy. The framers of the Code intended to give the honest debtor a 
fresh start by permitting the debtor to retain property while paying debts and to 
avoid the stigma of a Chapter 7 liquidation. Although the Code permits the 
honest debtor in Chapter 13 to accomplish these goals, certain provisions lend 
themselves to ambiguous interpretation to the extent that Chapter 13 may be 
used be used by the dishonest debtor to avoid payment of debts. 194 
Both Code cases and legal writers, however, fail to specify the location 
in the Code or in the Congressional debate where the requirement of a 
debtor's "honesty" appears. There are two good reasons for this failure. 
First, the Code does not contain the phrase; and second-to this writer's 
chagrin after reading every word of the legislative history-the phrase 
does not appear anywhere in the legislative history. 
Why, then, do the courts and commentators find this concept so 
attractive that they are willing to build their analyses on such chimerical 
ground? The answer is shockingly simple. Each time the "honest 
debtor'' language appears, it presages a broad good faith analysis and a 
finding of "lack of good faith." Were the "honest debtor'' restriction to 
exist, then it would be possible----or even easy--to limit the benefits of 
the broad Chapter 13 discharge to debtors deemed "honest." Presum-
ably, "honest debtors" would be those who have not offended the 
presiding court's moral sensibility. 
In the hindsight afforded by the "honest debtor" inquiry, we can 
understand what drives the broad good faith courts. They bridle at the 
possibility that unworthy debtors might achieve the benefits of Chapter 
13. It is the moral status of the debtor (worthy or unworthy, honest or 
dishonest), not the debtor's objectively observed conduct within the 
bankruptcy court, that is at issue. Therefore, if the debtor is determined 
to· be a member of the "suspect class" of "dishonest debtors," she can 
more easily be denied the benefits of bankruptcy protection. The 
193. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 57 B.R. 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Troyer, 24 
B.R. 727 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). 
194. Daniel G. Chadwick, In re Prine: Good Faith, Dischargeability and Conversion 
From a Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 115, 115 (1983). 
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"honest debtor" analysis is attractive because it encapsulates the court's 
implicit moral inquiry. 
This is the true pattern of the broad good faith cases. The moral 
inquiry that drives the broad good faith courts throws the debtor's 
history open to scrutiny, even though the Code does not support such an 
examination. The reason that courts are offended by the attempt to 
discharge what would be nondischargeable in Chapter 7 is that the 
debtor seems to be avoiding her just deserts: The· idea that the debtor 
abuses the spirit of the Code by seeking a Chapter 13 discharge follows 
the same line of reasoning: the debtor seeks to avoid her punishment by 
the subtle trickery of complying with the statute.195 For this reason the 
courts often cannot contain their outrage at the conduct of the debtor or 
at the facts giving rise to liability. 
From the beginning of its deliberations, a broad good faith court 
makes a moral inquiry. As previously noted, what characterizes the 
broad good faith inquiry is the unwillingness to read § 1325(a)(3) 
literally. Thus, courts have left the realm of law altogether. By 
focussing on the moral status of the debtor, the courts have stopped 
interpreting "good faith'' in Chapter 13 as a concept in the law rooted in 
a le~al text, and have dropped into the metaphysical world of morali-
ty.196 
195. Most of the broad good faith courts imply by their actions that it is an unfair 
manipulation of the use of Chapter 13 to discharge liability that the court does not 
believe should be discharged. A few courts, however, have explicitly stated that 
compliance with the formalities of Chapter 13 constitutes manipulation ofthe statute. See 
Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936, 941 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Good 
faith or basic honesty is the very antithesis of attempting to circumvent a legal obligation 
through a technicality of the law."); In re Davis, 68 B.R. 205,217 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1986) (quoting with approval, In re Waldron, 785 F.2d at 941). See also In re Carver, 
110 B.R. 305, 308 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990), in which the court makes the incredible 
admission that: "The courts have been guided by subjective, rather than legislative, 
considerations in defining the 'spirit and purpose' of Chapter 13, even at the expense of 
the express provisions of the Code." 
196. The twentieth century has produced successive waves of schools of textual 
interpretation. _These schools disagree at virtually every point in their 
Weltanschauungen. They would all agree, however, that the critical point in a text is the 
point at which the text seems to lose control of itself and spiral out of control of its 
stated intention. Among the leading lights in the field of text studies are the psychiatrist 
Sigmund Freud, the cultural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and the literary theorist 
Jacques Derrida. Freud identified the critical point as follows: 
480 
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which 
has to be left obscure .... [A]t that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts 
which cannot be unraveled and which moreover adds nothing to our 
knowledge of the content of the dream. This is the dream's navel, the spot 
where it reaches down into the unknown. The dream-thoughts . . . cannot . . . 
have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into 
the intricate network of our world of thought. · 
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Not only is the language of the courts moral, but so is their very 
orientation. When the courts eschew an examination of objective 
behavior and focus instead on internal, unknowable motivation, they 
abandon the mandate of the law. 
The distinction between law and moral inquiry is complex, but may 
be simply summarized. H.L.A. Hart presents the traditional distinction 
between law and morality as follows: 
The most famous attempt to convey in summary fashion their essential 
difference is the theory which asserts that, while legal rules only require 
'external' behavior and are indifferent to the motives, intentions, or other 
'internal' accompaniments of conduct, morals on the other hand do not require 
5 THE STANDARD EDmON OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND 
FREUD 525 (James Strachey ed., 1959). Levi-Strauss, describing the "key myth" upon 
which to base his structural analysis of myth, stated, ''the key myth is interesting not 
because it is typical, but rather because of its irregular position within the group. It so 
happens that this particular myth raises problems of interpretation that are especially 
likely to stimulate reflection." 1 CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, INTRODUCTION TO A SCIENCE 
OF MYTHOLOGY: THE RAW AND THE COOKED 2 (John & Doreen Weightman trans., 
Harper & Row 1969). Derrida used "metaphor" as an example of a site at which a text 
unravels: 
Since it marks the movement or the detour in which sense [meaning] may 
seem to launch out by itself, unloosed from the very object to which it 
nevertheless is pointed, from the truth which brings it into harmony with its 
referent, metaphor may set off an errant semantics. The sense of a noun, 
instead of designating the thing which the noun should normally designate, 
goes elsewhere. 
Jacques Derrida, White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy, 6 NEW 
LITERARY HISTORY 5, 41 (1974). It appears that the precedential authority cited in a 
legal opinion functions the same way as a metaphor, by opening the text to the extra-
textual. For Freud, Levi-Strauss, Derrida, and all of the text scientists, these caesurae 
are the point at which a text reveals its true self. 
Text science by any name (structuralism, deconstruction, grammatology, or 
anthropoetics) has earned a deservedly bad reputation in legal studies. As a result, it 
would not be proper to insist too strenuously that the Code and the cases interpreting it 
are one ''text," nor that "good faith" "deconstructs" the Bankruptcy Code. Yet the 
similarity between the holes in the texts of which Freud, Levi-Strauss and Derrida speak, 
and the hole punched by the broad good faith courts is suggestive. Even the most 
traditional of readers must admit that some of the "good faith" cases reach conclusions 
which, by studying the statute, are unpredictable. Because these cases are unpredictable, 
they pierce a hole in the Code, introducing unpredictability and incoherence into a text 
which was designed to enhance predictability and establish authority. Are the "good 
faith" cases the umbilicus which reveals the Code's own true self? Regrettably, this 
inquiry must await a subsequent opportunity for further discussion. 
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any specific external actions but only a good will or proper intentions or 
motive. 197 
Law focuses primarily on conduct, and secondarily on motivation. 
Morality places primary weight on motivation, and secondary weight on 
objective conduct. · 
This dichotomy is crystal clear in two major Western religious 
systems. In Judaism, a moral and a legal system coexist in the two parts 
of the halachah. 198 One part of the halachah may be called law; it 
concerns objective conduct. The other part might be called moral. The 
Yorn K.ippur199 liturgy reflects this latter portion. On Yorn K.ippur, 
Jews atone not only for intentional and knowing transgressions of Jewish 
law, but also, "[f]or the sin which [they] have sinned ... without 
knowledge; [and] ... for the sin that [they] have sinned ... through 
confusion of the heart."200 These phrases imply that the objective 
conduct may be set aside, so that the penitent can be judged on his 
intention. The theme can also be found throughout the Talmud: 
"R[abbi] Nahman bar Issac said: A transgression performed with a good 
motive is better than a precept [mitzvah or commandment] performed for 
an ulterior motive."201 Moreover, "[t]he one who performs numerous 
precepts and the one who performs only a few have equal merit, 
197. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 168 (1st ed., 1961). Ofcourse, Professor 
Hart only cites this summary distinction in order to destroy it. Professor Hart claims that 
the distinction is erroneous; he proceeds to derive four "cardinal related features" which 
point out the true distinctions. Id. at 169-176. Hart's real objection to the general 
distinction quoted here is apparently that it fails to acknowledge that law, too, is 
concerned with motivation. In this observation, he is obviously correct; nonetheless, this 
objection does not completely invalidate the distinction quoted. I would like to believe 
that Professor Hart would agree with me that law is concerned primarily with objective 
conduct and only secondarily with intention, whereas morality reverses the level of 
priority. 
198. Halachah generally means, ''The Way," and refers to the combined sources of 
Jewish Law. The code of Jewish law includes commandments from the Bible, as well 
as legal rulings from the Mishna (a first compendium of rabbinic interpretations and 
amplifications of the law) and the Talmud (a second compendium). Halachah also 
includes contemporary and current rulings and interpretations, more or less through 
present day. See RABBI HAYIM HALEVY DoNIN, To BE A JEW 29 (1972). 
199. "Yorn Kippur" is the "Day of Atonement," in which Jews confess their 
transgressions to God and request forgiveness. One can seek only divine forgiveness on 
Yorn Kippur; any transgressions against one's fellows must be addressed separately. The 
quoted portion of the liturgy, infra note 200, at 360-361, and accompanying text, 
highlights the similarity of the focus on intention in a context in which the standard of 
behavior is moral more than it is ethical (i.e., relating to the relationships with God 
rather than the relationship between persons). 
200. THE COMPLETE ARTSCROLL MACHZOR: YOM KIPPUR 360,361 (1992). 
201. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Nazir 23b, quoted in THE BOOK OF LEGENDS 460 
(William G. Braude trans., Hayim Nahman Bialik & Yehoshua Hana Ravnitzky eds., 
1992). 
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provided the heart is directed toward Heaven. "202 Thus, in this moral 
system, internal and subjective intention is of primary concern, while 
compliance with the law is of secondary importance. 
The pre-eminence of. internal motivation over external, objective 
actions is even more clear in Christianity. This clarity arises, in part, out 
of Christianity's historical dismissal of Jewish law. This pre-eminence 
is also presented starkly in the New Testament through its insistence that 
observance of the law is insufficient: "Woe unto you, scribes and 
Pharisees, hypocrites! For ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cumin, and 
have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and 
faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other un-
done. "203 The internal motivations matter in this moral system, as the 
following passages illustrate: "Thou blind Pharisee, cleanse first that 
which is within the cup and platter, that the outside of them may be 
clean also ... "204 "Even so ye also outwardly appear righteous unto 
men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity."205 Again, 
motivation is the primary concern, while conduct is only secondary. The 
foregoing complaints indict technical observance of the law as sly 
attempts to avoid moral judgment. 
B. The Power of the Court of Equity 
The moral inquiry undertaken by the broad good faith courts is not 
completely without precedent in common law jurisprudence. Bankruptcy 
courts--particularly the broad good faith courts-are fond of justifying 
their expansive inquiry with the broad powers that can be executed by 
a court of equity. Although bankruptcy evolved from the law mer-
chant,206 · there is no doubt that it arrived in the common law as a 
creature of equity. The Chancery courts maintained original jurisdiction 
over statutory bankruptcy in England.207 The receivership in equity 
202. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berachot 5b, quoted in THE BOOK OF LEGENDS 
460 (William G. Braude trans., Hayim Nahman Bialik & Yehoshua Hana Ravnitzky eds., 
1992). 
203. Matthew 23:25. 
204. Id. 
205. Matthew 23:28. 
206. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 63 (1973). 
207. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORYOFENGLISHLAW470-478 (A.L. Goodhart 
et al. eds., 4th ed., 1956). 
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approximated bankruptcy protection (at least for the creditors) before the 
advent of comprehensive bankruptcy codes. 208 
Equity and equitable remedies carry a heavy load of historical 
baggage. One legacy is a certain informality, an unwillingness either to 
state or to be bound by "elements" of a cause of action: "[T]he 
substantive rules of equity were made in response either to unduly rigid 
legal rules, or to their entire inadequacy . . . In the equity court it· did 
not matter whether the facts fitted some established form; relief would 
be given on the chancellor's sense of need and justice."209 Another 
legacy is the centrality of the judge and the reliance on the judge's 
idiosyncratic decision: "[R]elief would be given on the chancellor's 
sense of need and justice . . . . He decided the case himself, and he 
compelled what the law courts would not even permit-the testimony of 
the actual parties."210 The chancellor's remedies were also more 
powerful than those of his colleagues in the law courts,211 making him 
even more central in the system than a judge in a court of law. 
A final legacy looms quite large for present considerations, The 
equity system was not defined just by what it was not--not formal, not 
legal--but also by its peculiar focus. The kernel of a chancery question 
was moral. Equity courts use rules and equitable maxims,212 but "in 
each case the substantive rules were purportedly based on higher. moral 
principle."213 A chancery court might consider the petitioner's "clean 
hands," and "unclean hands may be any sort of conduct that equity 
considers unethical, even if that conduct is perfectly legal."214 
Thus, equity can be characterized as informal, idiosyncratic, and 
moral. It is certainly not surprising that an area of law descended from 
equity might contain traces of these elements. Nor is it particularly 
208. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 24 (1973). 
209. Id. at 25. 
210. Id. 
211. Professor Dobbs categorizes these remedies as coercive, restitutionary and 
declaratory. Id. It is interesting to consider how much of the modem practice of law 
relies on equitable remedies. In the author's experience, little civil litigation proceeds 
without the use of equitable remedies such as injunction and restitution; equally common 
is the use of measures of"good faith," or "clean hands." Perhaps the fusion of Law and 
Equity was a merger, but it often seems much more like a hostile ~akeover, with Law 
being the losing party. 
212. A few of the maxims are cited by Professor Dobbs. Id. at 44 n.24, 45 n.24. 
For the purpose of this article's analysis, some of the more interesting maxims are: "He 
who comes into equity must come with clean hands; ... Equitable remedies are given 
as a matter of grace or discretion, not of right; . . . Equity acts in personam, not in rem." 
Id. (citing G. KEETON, INTRODUCTION To EQUITY 116 (5th ed. 1961)). 
213. Id. at 25. 
214. Id. at 46. 
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surpnsmg that an equity court's analysis should take on a moral 
dimension. 
A moral dimension, however, differs from a moral inquiry. The moral 
inquiry undertaken by the broad good faith courts conflicts strongly with 
the purposes of both a system of law and a code of law. This conflict 
is never more evident than when we examine the purpose of commercial 
law and the function of the Code. 
C. Predictability and the Code . 
We have examined rather exhaustively one area of the commercial 
law: Bankruptcy's Chapter 13. To further understand the problem of 
moral inquiry in bankruptcy courts, it is necessary to examine the 
purpose of commercial law and the function of a code. 
A principal requirement for an efficient system of commerce is 
predictability. Merchants who are distant from one another must be able 
to predict each other's present and future conduct. For that reason, cases 
in commercial law are replete with allusion to certainty as "a prime 
objective,"215 an "overriding consideration,"216 or at least as a matter 
of high importance.217 Certainty has been a matter of cardinal impor-
tance in commercial law since the founding of the republic.218 The 
objective of the commercial code was to unify the commercial law to 
further promote certainty and predictability. 219 
Certainty is of equal concern in the Bankruptcy Code. The Code's 
provisions choreograph a complex dance of debtor, creditor and court, 
each of whom must know what to expect of the other dancers in the 
215. Lakeside Bride & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co. Inc., 445 U.S. 907, 
911 (1980) (J. White) (commenting on "commercial relations in which certainty ofresult 
is a prime objective"). 
216. Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing and Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697,698, 
699 (1963) (J. Harlan, concurring) (noting that "[c]ertainty in the law governing 
commercial transactions ... is an overriding consideration .... "). 
217. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 615 (1951) (J. Frankfurter, dissenting) 
(commenting on "the field of commercial law--where certainty is of high importance"). 
218. Sony Corp. of America v. Banlc One, 85 F.3d 131, 145 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating, 
in .the dissent, which is an excellent discussion of certainty in commercial law, that 
"[t]he cardinal principle of certainty has been the same in commercial law for more than 
200 years."). 
219. FSLIC v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 508 (5th Cir. 1992); Federal Ins. Co. v. NCNB 
Nat. Banlc ofN.C., 958 F.2d 1544, 1551 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he UCC has the objective 
of promoting certainty and predictability in commercial transactions."). 
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future. Bankruptcy courts insist that "certainty and finality" are goals of 
the Code.220 One case characterizes bankrugtcy as an area in which 
the need for certainty is "particularly acute." 21 Of course, given their 
mutual parent, the law merchant, it is not surprising that commercial law 
and bankruptcy share this objective. Nor is the primacy of certainty and 
predictability limited to commercial law. One opinion emphasized that 
"in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right."222 
Bankruptcy and commercial law share another characteristic: their 
means for achieving predictability. In bankruptcy law, predictability is 
accomplished primarily through formal codification. The purpose of a 
codification is the promotion of both uniformity and certainty. 223 
Whether the "Codes" appearing in American law are "true" codes, is a 
subject of some academic debate.224 However, the Bankruptcy Code 
certainly fits the definition of code as a compendium of law, "devising 
and shaping 'a coherent body of new or renovated rules' within a whole 
aimed at 'instituting or reviewing a· legal order. "'225 Two American 
220. Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 
388 (1993) (citing ''the Bankruptcy Code's goals of certainty and finality"); Allred v. 
Kennerley (In re Kennerley), 995 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1993) (speaking of"the need 
for certainty in determining which claims are and are not discharged"); Nelson Co. v. 
Counsel for the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Nelson Co.) 959 F.2d 
1260, 1266 (3rd. Cir. 1992) (noting certainty as one driving force in its decision). · 
221. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 166, 167 (3rd Cir. 1991) 
(beginning its analysis with the "proposition that in the context of bankruptcy 'the need 
for finality and certainty is especially acute."' (quoting Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 
F.2d 420,425 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Schneiderman, 940 F.2d 
911, 914 (3d Cir. 1991))). 
222. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). See also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 1767 (1995) (Rhenquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
223. See Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Fea'tUres and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. 
L. REV. 1073, 1073 (1988) ("A code is ... characterized by two fundamental functions: 
it gathers together written rules of law and it regulates different fields of law."). 
224. Professor Bergel distinguishes between ''true" or substantive codifications and 
"merely formal" codifications. Id. at 1076, 1077. Not surprisingly, this professor from 
the Universite de Droite, d'Economie et des Sciences d'Aix'Marseille III, finds that 
French codes are true codes and the American codes are not. On the one hand, he is 
undoubtedly right that "codes" such as the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code or the 
Georgia Civil Code "strive[ ] only to succeed in regrouping and classifying existing 
texts." Id. at. l 097. On the other hand, the purposes of the Bankruptcy and Commercial 
Codes meet the ''main goal of substantive or true codification[:] to achieve a material 
and systemic structure of the law". Id. 
225. Id. at 1077 (citing 1 G. CORNU, DROIT CIVIL, INTRODUCTION--LES 
PERSONNEs--LES BIENS, no. 222 (2nd ed. 1985)). Professor Bergel's objection to the 
common law codes seems to be two-folded. First, that they were not animated by a 
"political and ideological impulse," are not therefore ''the elaboration of a particular 
spirit," and thus cannot be true codes. Id. at 1077-1078. One wonders how any code 
not animated by a French emperor could meet this objection. Second, he objects that 
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scholars explain the rationale behind codification: "[I]f the law is put 
into a code (a well drafted one, of course) then its generally precise text 
will greatly reduce uncertainty, enhance predictability, and diminish the 
volume of legal disputes. ,;226 In essence, these writers argue that the 
code must be authoritative. While this statement specifically referred to 
the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, it could apply equally to 
the creation of the Bankruptcy Code.227 
Scholars appear to agree uniformly that the purpose of a code is to 
ensure predictability. The writers on codes and codification agree that 
much of the focus is on the layman ~ ability to predict the outcome of 
his actions. 
[T]he primary function of the codes . . . is not to guide the resolution of 
disputed cases by the courts, but to guide the daily life of honest citizens-to 
provide the rules on which the citizen can safely rely in the conduct of his 
affairs, whether in his family, or his place of employment or business, or in his 
relations with neighbors. It is precisely in performing this function that the 
general principles, standards rules and concepts of the code, can, despite Justice 
Holmes, "decide" a vast number of "concrete cases" in the sense of indicating 
what the citizen needs to do. 228 
Put more succinctly, a code should provide "an organized system of 
general rules which will be easy to discover so that from these rules, 
the common law codes do not attempt a codification of the entire body of civil law, but 
instead tend to be confined either to particular substantive areas or to "strive[ ] merely 
to ... regroup and reclassify" existing statutes. Id. at 1097. This objection receives 
further support in Dennis Tallon, Civil and Commercial Law, in 8 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF COMP. L. 47-56 (Konrad Zweigert ed., 1983). My colleagues from Code countries 
share this view of a code as an all-encompassing umbrella and, therefore, find codes 
such as the Bankruptcy Code to be curiously limited. 
226. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 20 (2d ed. 1980). 
227. There are obviously differences between the circum~tances which led to the 
creation of the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC had to 
unify a field in which each state had already established a corpus of existing law. The 
Bankruptcy Code essentially defined its field and then preempted any competitor (with 
assistance from the Constitution and Congress). Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted 
that Professors White and . Summers voice the intentions that animated not just the 
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, but also the Bankruptcy Code and its 
predecessors. 
228. Geoffrey Sawyer, The Western Conception of Law, in 2 INT'L ENCYLOPEDIA 
OF COMP. L. 32 (Rene David ed., 1983) (emphasis in original). The phrase "honest 
citizen" is both inexplicable and tantalizing. It is inexplicable because even Napoleonic 
Code countries have laws which govern the actions of the dishonest citizens. A civil 
code should therefore cover both. It is tantalizing in light of the discussion in the text 
of the parthenogenesis of the term ''honest debtor." 
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through an easy process, judges and citizens may deduce the manner in 
which this or that practical difficulty must be solved."229 
In what sense do the broad good faith courts fulfill the twin necessi-
ties of authority and predictability? When the courts ignore the plain 
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, they make the Code unreliable 
because the statutory words no longer mean what they appear to mean. 
Through idiosyncratic and unpredictable interpretations of Code 
language, broad good faith courts make the Code unpredictable as well. 
Even the courts complain about the confusion of opinions on "good 
faith."230 How well are these courts-the majority of Chapter 13 
courts--serving the Code and the law? 
V. GOOD FAITH, BAD LAW 
The author believes that the primary problem with the broad good 
faith analysis is that it imports a moral inquiry into the Bankruptcy 
Code. This article, however, should not be read to criticize any moral 
or religious view. The author does not intend to denigrate either of the 
moral systems previously mentioned. Nor does the author mean to 
encourage the reprehensible view that personal morality and the practice 
of law are separate disciplines, or that ethics is merely a course taught 
in law school. To the contrary, the author believes that a person cannot 
properly practice law without a strong sense of personal morality 
informing her actions. 
Moral and legal systems, nevertheless, have differing methodologies 
and differing ends. Law and morality may be related-we are best 
advised to leave the exact definition of that relationship to moral 
scholars-but they are distinctly separate.231 For this reason, the 
229. Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. 
REV. at 1081 (1988). 
230. In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876 (Bankr. W.D. Ken. 1980) (noting a confusion of 
opinions); In re Jones, 119 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) (noting an infinity of 
opinions); Public Fin. Corp. v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1983) (referring to the 
issue as "unsettled"). 
231. One further example demonstrates how distinct law and morality are as 
systems. As discussed supra, notes 196-205 and accompanying text, moral systems 
focus on intention. In law, intention is an element of many causes of action. However, 
two points must be observed: First, in both criminal and civil contexts, the malfeasor 
is judged principally upon his objectively determinable conduct. Perhaps this is because 
intent may be inferred but is objectively unknowable, whereas conduct can be proven. 
Second, even where intention or scienter is an element of a cause of action, it can only 
be proven by inference or indirect evidence. Many jury instructions on intention 
explicitly permit the jury to infer that "a person intends the natural and probable 
consequences" of his actions because intent can never be directly known. 1 Eow ARD D. 
DEVTIT, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE INSTRUCTIONS§ 17.07 (4th ed. 1992). In a 
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importation of external inquiries into an objective legal system creates 
an insupportable tension that disrupts and distorts the law. 
The disruption manifests itself in several ways. The principal result 
of the tension is that the interpretation of the statute, as read by the 
majority of courts, becomes unpredictable, and therefore less than 
authoritative. However, there are other problems. The broad good faith 
courts, in re-writing the statute, violate the Constitutional separation of 
powers. Moreover, in undertaking a moral analysis, the courts often 
adopt informal procedures which threaten due process. The broad good 
faith movement creates a class of "bad debtors" who are a priori 
presumed undeserving of Code protection, irrespective of what is stated 
in the statute. Although there is insufficient space to examine these 
problems in detail, a few words should be said about each. 
The author previously noted the importance of predictability in 
commercial law and in bankruptcy law in particular. The importation of 
the moral inquiry into the Bankruptcy Code makes the outcome of the 
"good faith" analysis unpredictable in practice. A debtor must guess 
what a court will do, given his particular jurisdiction and a particular 
judge. If the debtor has the misfortune of being assigned to a broad 
good faith court, the debtor is unable to anticipate how the bankruptcy 
judge will view the debtor and her particular history. The same conduct 
which will constitute good faith in one court will cause a plan to be 
denied for "bad faith" in another. Because the broad good faith cases 
recognize no anchoring text or principle, the Code and the cases provide 
almost no practical guidance as to what might occur once the debtor files 
his petition in Chapter 13.232 For debtors concerned with their own 
moral system, either the standards of conduct are metaphysical or the Judge is perfect 
and omniscient. In either case, intent is presumed to be knowable. Moral judgements 
about a person's character tend to be absolute ("dishonest," "impenitent," etc.), as though 
these judgements reach beyond conduct, delving into a person's true essence. Moreover, 
in a moral system, the standards of evidence tend to be informal ( one assumes that the 
Judge can, in fact, hear inadmissible evidence and still set it aside while coming to a 
judgment) because the Judge is omniscient. Interestingly, this informality of procedure 
is picked up by the broad good faith courts, although presumably the bankruptcy court 
judges claim somewhat less perfection than their omnipotent Colleague. Thus, a 
confusion over which system empowers a judge could easily result in either the 
judgement of a person's moral essence rather than their conduct, or in a willingness to 
rely on less formal procedures once the moral truth is deemed "obvious," rather than rely 
on statutory authority. 
232. Pity the poor bankruptcy lawyer who has to represent a debtor with a 
checkered past! Not only does the practitioner have conflicting ethical duties to the 
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immediate problems, the problem of unpredictability looms even larger 
than the jurisprudential problems that will subsequently be discussed. 
For debtors, the consumers and beneficiaries of the Code, the greatest 
concern is the practical and immediate question: How will I be treated? 
However, the concern about predictability is not merely parochial. It 
concerns all legal systems and all cultures: 
At the root of everyday life in any society there must necessarily be some 
patterns of habitual conduct followed by the members, providing a basis upon 
which one member will be able to predict how another is likely to behave under 
given circumstances and how his own actions will be received.233 
Certainty and predictability must be the essence of a legal system. Yet 
a debtor in a Chapter 13 can have little certainty about how a court will 
behave or how her own actions will be received. 
There are jurisprudential -problems which must also be noted. First, 
consider the question of the courts rewriting the statute. The statute 
states that "good faith" relates to proposal of a plan; the broad good 
faith courts ignore this directive. A few courts point out that a broad 
good faith reading infringes on Congressional prerogatives.234 This 
writer could find no response by the broad good faith courts to that 
charge. But it is not a criticism to be ignored. When the courts re-write 
legislation, they violate the separation of powers, which is a principal 
foundation of our constitutional system. The recognition that courts 
could interpret but not rewrite statutes primarily dawned with Marbury 
v. Madison.235 In that case, Chief Justice Marshall determined that the 
courts should not entertain political questions.236 There has been great 
debate over what constitutes a political questions, but there is little 
debate over the proposition that political.questions include all matters on 
which Congress has spoken constitutionally.237 The broad good faith 
courts showcase the danger inherent in judicial encroachment. The 
courts' re-writing of the statute to avoid ends they abhor may seem 
harmless when the imported values are moral. Yet, if courts can give 
themselves moral license to ignore the plain meaning of a statute, what 
prevents them from similarly licensing themselves to import terms 
estate and to the client, but she cannot predict which factors the court will use to judge 
the plan she has assisted the client in drafting. Must the lawyer notify her malpractice 
carrier each time she files a Chapter 13 plan? 
. 233. SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 25 (1979). 
234. See discussion supra notes 94, 95. 
235. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
236. Id. 
237. See CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TIIE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 
§ 14 (3d ed. 1976). · 
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contrary to the Constitution, or contrary to the common law tradition, or 
contrary to democratic values?238 
Most of the courts remain ignorant of the problem or ignore it. Some 
opinions, however, clarify that in rewriting the statute, the broad good 
faith courts ignore the clear signals of the Supreme Court239 and usurp 
legislative prerogative.240 One court cautions: "Without some defini-
tion, an exercise of discretion could be arbitrary and an abuse."241 
Occasionally, the broad good faith courts recognize the limits as they 
trample them, as exemplified by the following passage: "The courts have 
been guided by subjective, rather than legislative, considerations in 
defining the 'spirit and purpose' of Chapter 13, even at the expense of 
the express provisions of the Code."24 Chillingly, many courts are 
shameless in announcing their intent to ignore the plain words of the 
statute: "A statute should not be applied strictly in accord with its literal 
238. This must be acknowledged as a particularly painful epiphany to those of us 
who grew up cheering the aggressive activism of the Warren Court. The Warren Court 
seemed to seek out injustice and strike it down, acting heroically in areas in which the 
legislature seemed incapable of acting. The decisions of the broad good faith courts 
illustrate why judicial activism creates systemic legal problems. When courts have no 
anchor to restrain them, they may act in unpredictable and ultimately destructive ways. 
The results of judicial activism may fit our own individual agendas. These results, 
. however, may also undermine our agendas in two different ways. First, the judicial 
activists may serve an agenda contrary to our own. Second, and more importantly, 
judicial activism weakens the judicial system by subjecting the law to the kinds of 
pressures which bend and tear the fabric of the law. The damage done to the legal 
system as a whole may be catastrophic when courts refuse to recognize any external 
standard (e.g., a statute or the Constitution) to anchor their decisions. What would 
happen, for example, if a majority of courts adopted the "God's law over man's law" 
argument advanced in some areas of heated cultural debate? If courts may ignore or 
distort legal principles which result in (for them) unconscionable ends, then what 
predictability and what principles would long survive? 
239. See cases cited supra note 95. Query: if the Supreme Court is not supreme, 
what is it? 
240. The Supreme Court, presumably the ultimate judicial branch arbiter of the 
issue, clearly considers this to be legislative prerogative. See, e.g. Taylor v. Freeland 
& Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644, 645 (1992) (declining to read into a section of the Code. 
provisions to limit bad faith claims, and stating: "To the extent that [the Code sections] 
do not [provide the necessary limitations], Congress may enact comparable provisions 
to address the difficulties that [the creditor] predicts will follow our decision. We have 
no authority to limit the application [ of the statute.]"). See also cases cited supra note 
95. 
241. In re Farley, 114 B.R 711, 713 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990). 
242. In re Carver, 110 B.R 305, 308 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, 1990). 
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meaning where to do so would pervert its manifest meaning."243 It is 
difficult to view this statement as justification for anything less than the 
"arbitrary" and "abusive" actions warned of above.244 
A related jurisprudential problem with the broad good faith courts is 
that when they import the moral elements of the equitable inquiry, they 
seem also to import the informal procedures of the old courts of equity. 
In Neufeld v. Freeman, for example, the Fourth Circuit based its "lack 
of good faith" holding on nondischargeability.245 This was not a 
nondischargeability determination that had been adjudicated by a court: 
the claims were only "arguably ... render[ ed] ... nondischargeable in 
a Chapter 7 case. "246 The court, nevertheless, stated that no formal 
finding ever needed to be made: 
Of course the issue of dischargeability in Chapter 7 need not, and cannot, be 
litigated to conclusion in every Chapter 13 confirmation proceeding. Where 
significant claims involve conduct that would otherwise raise serious Chapter 
7 dischargeability issues, however, the quality of that conduct is part of the 
''totality of circumstances" which must be weigl!ed, with other factors, in 
assessing the debtor's good faith under chapter 13.247 
Nor did the burden of proof need to be as high as it would need to be 
elsewhere: 
If the court discovers unmistakable manifestations of bad faith ... confirmation 
must be denied. Unmistakable manifestations of bad faith need not be based 
upon a finding of actual fraud requiring proof of malice, scienter or an intent 
to defraud. We simply require that the bankruptcy courts preserve the integrity 
of the bankruptcy process by refusing to condone its abuse.248 
Thus a debtor's conduct may be determined nondischargeable without 
an opportunity for the kind of hearing to which, were she in Chapter 7, 
she would be entitled. Moreover, this determination may be made on 
minimal proof, insufficient to support an actual finding. This is the kind 
of informal procedure which the old courts of equity might condone; in 
American jurisprudence, this informality treads close to a denial of due 
process. 
The reader may dismiss these concerns as mere glitches in a complex 
system that requires a little fine-tuning. We may wish to trust the 
system of justice not to allow the courts to wander too far astray. 
243. In re Adamo, 619.F.2d 216, 222 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. 
Williams v. New York Higher Educ. Services, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); see also In re 
Meltzer, 11 B.R. 624, 627 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1981) (citing In re Adamo with approval). 
244. See discussion supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text. 
245. 794 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1986). 
246. Id. at 151. 
247. Id. at 153. 
248. Id. 
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Perhaps the problems of the violation of separation cif powers and denial 
of due process are minor issues, small monsters to be dealt with when 
they have grown larger and more imminent. For one particular group of 
debtors, however, the problems associated with the broad good faith 
inquiry are huge and present. This is the undefined class who will be 
found to be ''undeserving" of the_ discharge offered by Chapter 13. The 
broad good faith analysis threatens to create a class of disfavored 
debtors whose experience in bankruptcy court is more likely to be 
unpleasant than other debtors in similar economic situations. Courts are 
creating a class of bad debtors who do not "deserve" bankruptcy 
protection, by labeling them "dishonest debtors" or merely ''undeserv-
ing." This has to be of concern to any debtor with a blemished pre-
bankruptcy history. Professionals who seek protection in bankruptcy 
should be particularly concerned. If the broad good faith courts are 
going to judge any debtor harshly, who better deserves their wrath than 
the professional who seeks to discharge malpractice liability by invoking 
the protection of Chapter 13? After all, these are debtors whom the 
bankruptcy courts have already been treating with increased scrutiny, 249 
and who may choose Chapter 13 to discharge what would not be 
dischargeable in Chapter 7. To the problems of unpredictability, 
separation of powers, denial of due process, add fairness: Is it fair for 
courts to create a suspect class of debtors without statutory or legislative 
authority? 
This article does not argue that the broad good faith courts err in their 
concerns about the proper qualifications for a Chapter 13 action. One 
may reasonably argue that professionals do not deserve protection in 
bankruptcy. The issue of the discharge of nondischargeable debts can 
also be debated. The use of the Code by "dishonest debtors" certainly 
needs to be debated and must be resolved. These are legitimate concerns 
of educated, intelligent and well meaning jurists. These concerns should 
be aired and debated, both in academic journals and in Congress. 
The problem with the broad good faith courts is not their concern but 
their conduct. These courts should consider the likely results of their 
actions. A law that is unpredictable will be ignored. Courts and 
commentators already complain about the number of unacceptable plans 
presented. But who can determine what the rule is when every court has 
249. See Elbein, supra note 3. 
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its own? Moreover, the proper advice to a debtor with a questionable 
past may be to file under Chapter 7 in order to avoid the unpredictable 
results of the good faith analysis. The ultimate burden of the unpredict-
ability will thus be borne by the creditors, who by definition would 
receive less under Chapter 7 than under Chapter 13250 and would, 
therefore, be burdened by additional Chapter 7 filings. 
The effects of the unpredictability inherent in the broad good faith 
analysis may reach far beyond Chapter 13. This unbounded analysis 
threatens to tear the text of the Bankruptcy Code open to the personal 
interpretation of an individual judge who recognizes no limits on his 
interpretative discretion. The hole in the Code, having been worked 
open, may fray and tear with the interjection of the courts' idiosyncratic 
interpretations until "good faith" truly means nothing. It is not 
unreasonable to believe that this cancer could easily spread to Chapter 
11 's "good faith" requirement (if it is not already working there in the 
guise of a "good faith filing requirement"). Nor is there any reason to 
believe that this approach must be limited to the bounds of the Code. 
If bankruptcy courts can ignore both the clear words of the statute and 
the mandate of the Supreme Court, then why not ignore the troublesome 
wording of banking statutes, or the criminal law, or even amendments 
to the Constitution? What body of law can survive the reinterpretation 
of its major provisions in ways not restrained by anything beyond the 
courts' own idiosyncratic values? Whatever meaning Congress intended 
for "good faith," Congress surely did not intend to license an undermin-
ing of the authority of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Courts may legitimately concern themselves with morality and law. 
In doing so, however, they should remember the injunction of the 
greatest proponent and expositor of the moral law. Immanuel Kant 
derived the following supreme principle for ethical conduct: "Act on a 
maxim the ends of which are such as it might be a universal law for 
everyone to have."251 That is: Act in ways which, if adopted by all of 
society, would cause no societal harm; avoid acting in ways which, if 
adopted by all, would damage society. 
In examining "good faith" in Chapter 13, we have seen the results of 
defying Kant's categorical imperative. When courts fail to recognize the 
plain meaning of a statute as a restraint, and instead rely on their own 
250. This is the "definition" of§ 1325( a)( 4 ), which requires that the creditor receive 
"not less than the amount that would be paid ... under chapter 7." 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(a)(4) (1994). 
251. hnmanuel Kant, Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysics of Ethics 
(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans.), in 42 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 373 
(Robert Maynard Hutchinson et al. eds., 1952). 
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moral values, they render the Code unpredictable· and undermine its 
authority. However, the damage is not irreparable. Courts can act in a 
manner which "might become a universal law," the manner that is 
required by our legal system. Bankruptcy courts must recognize the 
plain meaning of the Code as a restraint on their good faith activism. 
Only in this manner, can these courts repair the hole already worn into 
the integrity of the Code, providing much needed certainty, equality, and 
predictability. 
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